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Preface & Acknowledgements 
When I started my dissertation project, I already was a fully trained Ger-
man lawyer who had experienced different aspects of the legal profession. 
After working for the German Federal Environmental Agency, I decided to 
expand and internationalize my skills and knowledge beyond law by enrolling 
in an English language master’s program in Integrated Natural Resource Man-
agement in the Department of Agricultural Economics and Social Sciences, 
Faculty for Agriculture and Horticulture, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. En-
couraged by my master’s thesis in the field of resource and institutional 
economics and by the pleasure I took in the topic as well as in the scientific 
work itself, I took a further step toward a scientific career and chose to write 
an interdisciplinary doctoral thesis. As this turned out to be my second career 
path, it was important for me not only to conduct my own research but also to 
be included in a lively scientific environment with opportunities for exchange 
and to experience all further different facets of the scientific profession. On 
this basis, I joined the recently started CIVILand junior research group funded 
by the Federal Ministry for Education and Research (BMBF) through the So-
cial-ecological Research (SÖF) program, which was based at the Leibniz-
Centre for Agricultural Landscape Research (ZALF).  
The CIVILand research group generally focused on the diversity of Pay-
ments for Ecosystem Services (PES) in Germany, Great Britain, and the United 
States of America (US) as well as on the roles of the different actors involved, 
with a special emphasis on civil society. Because my master’s thesis essentially 
addressed the implementation of ecosystem-based EU environmental regula-
tions in Germany, I thereby realized the actual major impact of governmental 
financial incentives for the governance of ecosystems and understood that 
building upon this to focus my research on governmental financial incentives, 
which have been increasingly discussed internationally under the term PES, 
was a next plausible step. Furthermore, due to the knowledge that I gained 
from my master’s in terms of the influences of informal rules and mental mod-
els on environmental governance, which are strongly dependent on the 
cultural context, I considered the possibility of conducting a multi-country 
comparison through the CIVILand research group a very valuable starting 
point for my research.  
The research group was composed of seven to eleven team members 
trained in almost as many disciplines who worked on various thematic subpro-
jects in a collaborative structure. My focus on governmental PES flanked the 
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other subprojects, which were rather targeted to civil society initiatives and 
impacts. Various general aspects of the core topic of PES have been collabora-
tively examined from different perspectives. All in all, the group provided an 
interdisciplinary, innovative, flexible, inspiring, and adaptive research envi-
ronment that enabled me, on the one hand, to consider my research objectives 
in a contemporary manner through a cumulative dissertation by collaborating 
with different colleagues on various sub-questions and, on the other hand, to 
always maintain the right combination of profound theoretical thought and 
practical relevance. Furthermore, the research group’s considerable funding 
facilitated the presentation of the results at several international and self-
organized conferences as well as at external workshops, which allowed for 
manifold external input, networking, and scientific self-positioning.  
Finally, my affiliation with the Leibniz-Centre for Agricultural Landscape 
Research (ZALF) enabled me to gain various experiences in the scientific pro-
fession itself. In particular, the development of and the participation in new 
research projects within the scope of my research interests fruitfully broad-
ened the perspective of my dissertation project and this work substantially 
contributed to satisfactory understanding and management of my research 
objectives. Furthermore, the ZALF supported my participation in different 
advanced trainings on the topic as well as a visiting scholarship at New York 
University to obtain further content input and conclude certain aspects of my 
thesis. At the end of my dissertation project, I would like to state that the pos-
itive experience of working on my doctoral thesis within both the CIVILand 
research group and the ZALF has encouraged me to follow the scientific ca-
reer path.  
Herewith, I would like to thank to my supervisors and referees. First of all, I 
am extremely grateful to Prof. Dr. Bettina Matzdorf, who introduced different 
aspects of the scientific career to me, offered me various opportunies to par-
ticipate in diverse projects, gave me a lot of freedom to follow my ideas, and 
always supported me with good advice and constructive criticism. Second, I 
am indepted to Prof. Dr. Klaus Müller, who gave me the scientific and financial 
support of the ZALF to finish this dissertation.  Third, I thank Prof. Dr. Stefan-
ie Engel for her willingness to co-supervise my dissertation, the fast 
evaluation process, and her supportive and constructive input. And finally, I 
am grateful to Dr. Christian Schleyer, Dr. Carsten Mann, Dr. Lasse Loft, and 
Dr. Jens Rommel for a supportive and inspiring defense. 
I would also like to express my special appreciation to my great present and 
past working group members, particularly, Sarah “the incredible” Schomers 
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for the best office times ever, Michaela Reutter, Dr. Claudia Sattler, Carolin 
Biedermann, Kristin Nicolaus, Lina Yap, Thomas Krikser, Dr. Jens Jetzkowitz, 
Dr. Barbara Schröter, Lukas Wortmann, Susanne Trampnau, and Cheng Chen. 
Furthermore, I am indepted to Dr. Ingo Zasada, Prof. Dr. Andreas Thiel, Harry 
Hoffmann; all the CiVinetschies; Gerlinde Prentkowski, Kerstin Franke, Ange-
lika Neumeyer; the entire ZALF Socioeconomics Department; the ZALF 
Library; the Travel Cost and Procurement Departments; all FONA CIVILand 
project partners; and colleagues at the GUND Institute Vermont and the NYU 
Department of Environmental Studies, especially Prof. Dr. Dale Jamieson, 
Prof. Dr. Jennifer Jaqcuet, Prof. Dr. David Frank, and Prof. Dr. Sindhu Radha-
krishna. I am also extremely grateful to all experts and stakeholders for 
spending their time and sharing their knowledge with me, and to Martin Ge-
meinholzer for the great design and layout of the thesis. 
The generous funding for my doctoral studies came mainly from the Federal 
Ministry for Education and Research (BMBF) through the Social-ecological 
Research (SÖF) program (grant no. 01UU0911). I received additional funding 
from  the Testing and Development Project (grant no. 3510 88 0300) granted 
by the Federal Agency for Nature Conservation (BfN), and institutional fund-






The central focus of my thesis is the identification and analysis of institu-
tional aspects of governmental Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) in 
developed countries. In recent years, PES have been progressively acknowl-
edged as useful governance solutions for resource management, and 
researchers as well as practitioners have been increasingly engaged in this 
approach. In the public policy context, on the one hand, PES is based on the 
academic ecosystem service (ES) concept that has entered the policy arena, 
while, on the other hand, some previously designed governmental policy 
measures, such as agri-environmental schemes, influence the developing defi-
nition of PES. These juxtaposed tendencies are not independent from each 
other. On the contrary, both tendencies are part of a continuous process of 
defining and specifying PES. Correspondingly, my analysis is twofold. In the 
first part, I analyzed the design and performance of existing governmental en-
vironmental payment schemes that are increasingly defined as PES even if 
they are not focused on clearly defined ES. In my dissertation, I also applied a 
broad definition of PES that includes such existing agri-environmental pay-
ment schemes. In the second part, I examined the influence of the ES concept 
on the framing and design of as well as the environmental governance through 
such payments schemes. Based on institutional economics ideas, I broadly 
structured my two general research objectives in terms of institutional design, 
performance, and interplay.  
Five individual research papers shed light on the issues raised above. Re-
garding existing incentives, the first paper explores relevant design principles 
of German governmental agri-environmental payments to meet environmen-
tal goals. The second paper shows how German and US governmental payments 
interact with the institutional arrangements in place. In terms of the ES con-
cept, the third paper depicts the design principles of an ES-based policy, shows 
where to find them among existing EU and US agri-environmental and envi-
ronmental policies, demonstrates possible influences on preferences and 
values, and points to interactions of ES with environmental policies, especially 
PES. The two further publications provide a broader empirical basis for these 
more specific analyses: The fourth paper classifies German and US PES in gen-
eral, and the fifth paper examines agri-environmental payment integration into 
environmental policy and cross-sectoral interplay in Germany. Each paper 
mainly addresses one of the objectives, but together, these papers deliver im-




My key findings indicate certain design rule sets that can be crucial for en-
vironmentally effective governmental PES. Here, a combination of targeting 
one specific environmental goal and area/habitat, feasibility of application for 
land users, and information and advice are especially important. In addition to 
such specifically targeted schemes, the multi-targeted whole farm approach 
organic farming, a payment scheme that concurrently targets different envi-
ronmental goals and all farm areas also implies environmental effectiveness. I 
argue that mixes of both special single goal/area targeting and broader multi-
targeting PES seem promising to enable extensive ES provision. Payments for 
Ecosystem Services interact with the institutional arrangements in place, es-
pecially property rights. The payments may be used to foster compliance with 
regulations or to induce changes in informal or formal rules. Potential crowd-
ing-in and crowding-out effects are outlined, for example, changes in rule 
acceptance or in assumptions about use rights. Furthermore, governmental 
agri-environmental payment schemes can help to ensure the fulfillment of 
overall national environmental goals and may interact vertically and horizon-
tally with other policies. Therefore, cross-sectoral and cross-level cooperation 
as well as vertical integration are required and new institutions may emerge. 
Finally, payments may combine environmental and social goals. When used to 
reduce inconsistencies and/or generate justification, such payments are often 
poorly targeted, and the resulting ES provision is strongly affected by other 
factors, such as price fluctuations in commodity markets or other policies fos-
tering actions.  
Regarding the ES concept, I revealed that, so far, design principles for ES-
driven policies have hardly been included in existing EU and US environmental 
policies but that their integration is proceeding. The ES concept has a large 
influence on actors’ perceptions, preferences, and values. It can improve eco-
system-related resource understanding and considering different ES based on 
win–win scenarios and trade-offs of different decisions and actions. Imple-
menting ES in environmental and agri-environmental policies will, on the one 
hand, require broad cross-sectoral and cross-level cooperation but, on the 
other hand, will facilitate the latter. The greatest future influence on policy 
design is predicted regarding climate and agricultural policies, especially on 
existing payment schemes (already in a broad PES definition). The ES concept 
is increasingly assumed to merge with existing governmental agri-
environmental payment schemes, placing ES at the center to explain and legit-




environmental payment schemes could especially foster targeting of and col-
laborating between the environmental and agricultural sectors.  
Finally, I assume that governmental PES are essential elements of a con-
temporary developed country's environmental policy mix. Effective targeting 
and integration of governmental PES are important, for example, in the align-
ment of agri-environmental payment implementation and EU water policy. 
The decision of when to use input- or output-based payments shall be careful-
ly considered. Further knowledge on the integration of a mix of different PES 
into environmental and agricultural policies is required. Moreover, to create 
and achieve a sound mix of PES with environmental regulations and income 
(social) support policies, the property rights situation, the reference point for 
application of the ‘provider-gets’ and ‘beneficiary-pays’ principles, and any 
deviations therefrom should be made transparent. For sound PES integration, 
different actors must collaborate on basis of common denominators, which 
may be based on the ES concept. Correspondingly, I discuss the potential of 
ES to enhance communication among actors and provide new impulses for 
cross-sectoral and cross-level cooperation in existing governmental payments 
scheme (defined as PES) implementation. I further argue that regarding gov-
ernmental payments, systematic ES definition and quantification may offer 
the opportunity to enhance targeting, even if this is a very complex procedure. 
Economic valuation and monetarization of ES, in turn, are not necessary for 
PES, and the application of such methods must be carefully considered. Yet, 
these methods potential usefulness, i.e., producing meaningful results in par-






Meine Doktorarbeit untersucht institutionelle Aspekte von staatlichen 
Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES, deutsch: positive Anreizinstrumente 
in Form von Zahlungen für Ökosystemleistungen) in Industrieländern. In den 
vergangenen Jahren wurde der Nutzen von PES als Umweltsteuerungsin-
strument vermehrt hervorgehoben und eine steigende Anzahl 
Wissenschaftler und Praktiker befassen sich zunehmend mit einer 
Weiterentwicklung und Umsetzung von PES. Dabei werden zum einen ex-
istierende Umweltpolitiken und -gesetzgebungen von einem 
wissenschaftlichen Ecosystem Services (ES) Konzept (Ökosystemleistung-
skonzept) geprägt. Andererseits beeinflussen gleichzeitig die bestehenden 
staatlichen finanziellen Anreizinstrumente wie Agrarumweltmaßnahmen ih-
rerseits die Weiterentwicklung des PES-Verständnisses. Beide Tendenzen 
sind nicht unabhängig voneinander, sondern Teil eines kontinuierlichen Defi-
nitions- und Spezifizierungsprozesses. Dementsprechend ist meine Analyse 
zweiteilig. Im ersten Teil untersuche ich das Design und die Performance von 
bestehenden staatlichen finanziellen Anreizinstrumenten, welche vermehrt 
als PES verstanden werden, auch wenn sie keine klar definierten ES 
bereitstellen. Dabei greife ich für meine Arbeit auch auf eine weite Definition 
von PES zurück, die unter anderem Agrarumweltmaßnahmen umfasst. Im 
zweiten Teil der Analyse untersuche ich die Relevanz des ES Konzeptes für 
die Ausgestaltung von bestehenden Zahlungsmechanismen und deren Wir-
kung. Diese beiden generellen Forschungsfragen werden vor dem 
Hintergrund institutionenökonomischer Ideen hinsichtlich institutionellem 
Design, institutioneller Performance und institutionellem Interplay 
strukturiert und konkretisiert.  
Die im Rahmen der Forschung gewonnenen Erkenntnisse werden in fünf 
individuellen Veröffentlichungen dargestellt. Das erste Paper fokussiert auf 
existierende PES und beleuchtet die relevanten Gestaltungprinzipien 
deutscher Agarumweltmaßnahmen für die Erreichung von Umweltzielen. Das 
zweite Paper zeigt, wie staatliche agrar- bzw. agrarumweltpoltitische Zahlung-
en in Deutschland und den USA mit bestehenden institutionellen Strukturen 
interagieren. Hinsichtlich der Ausgestaltung des ES Konzeptes hebt das dritte 
Paper Prinzipien einer auf dem ES Konzept basierenden Politik hervor und 
beschreibt, wo diese in EU und US Umwelt- und Agrarumweltpolitiken zu 
finden sind. Hierbei werden mögliche Einflüsse auf Präferenzen und Werte 




umweltpolitik, insbesondere mit Zahlungsmechanismen, aufgezeigt. Zwei 
weitere Paper definieren den Kontext für diese konkreteren Analysen: Das 
vierte Paper klassifiziert die allgemeinen Grundlagen deutscher und US- 
amerikanischer PES, während das fünfte Paper darstellt, wie Agarumwelt-
maßnahmen sektorübergreifend in die ökosystembezogene Umweltsteuerung 
integriert werden müssen. Die Inhalte der einzelnen Publikationen tragen in 
erster Linie zu einem der beiden Forschungsziele (die Untersuchung beste-
hender Instrumente sowie des Einflusses des ES-Konzeptes) bei, während sie 
in der Gesamtschau einen umfassenden Beitrag zu beiden Zielen liefern. 
Die Hauptergebnisse meiner Arbeit sind die Ableitung und Darstellung bes-
timmter Gestaltungsregeln, die entscheidend für die effektive Gestaltung 
staatlicher PES sein können. Es zeigt sich, dass eine Kombination aus Zielge-
richtetheit (ein Umweltziel, bestimmte Fläche oder Habitate), Flexibilität in 
der Anwendung für den Landnutzer und Informationen und Beratung für den 
Erfolg von PES wichtig sind. Neben solch spezifisch zielgerichteten Maßnah-
men verspricht auch der auf verschiedene Umweltziele ausgerichtete, den 
ganzen landwirtschaftlichen Betrieb mit einbeziehende Ansatz des 
ökologischen Landbaus effektive Wirkungen. Darauf aufbauend wird 
diskutiert ob eine optimalere Versorgung mit nachgefragten ES durch gut 
abgestimmte Instrumentenmixe aus spezifisch auf ein Ziel gerichteten PES 
und breiteren, verschiedene Ziele erfassenden Maßnahmen gewährleistet 
werden kann. Payments for Ecosystem Services interagieren mit bestehenden 
institutionellen Strukturen, insbesondere mit Eigentumsrechten. Sie könnten 
dafür genutzt werden, die Einhaltung bestimmter Gesetzgebung zu fördern 
oder Veränderungen informeller und formeller Regeln einzuleiten. 
Diesbezüglich werden potentielle ‚Crowding-in‘ und ‚Crowding-out‘ Effekte 
beschrieben, wie z.B. eine veränderte Akzeptanz von Regeln oder eine verän-
derte Annahme über eigene Nutzungsrechte an Ressourcen. Ferner können 
staatliche PES (insbesondere Agrarumweltmaßnahmen) dabei helfen, 
grundsätzliche nationale Umweltpolitikziele zu erfüllen, und interagieren 
dabei vertikal und horizontal mit verschiedenen anderen Umweltpolitiken. 
Dafür sind insbesondere sektor- und ebenenübergreifende Kooperationen 
sowie eine vertikale Integration wichtig und es können neue Institutionen 
entstehen. Schließlich können durch Zahlungen Umweltziele und soziale Ziele 
kombiniert werden, um instrumentelle Inkonsistenzen zu reduzieren oder 
Rechtfertigungen zu generieren. Solche Zahlungen sind oft nicht zielgerichtet 




ssen abhängig, wie Preisveränderungen an Rohstoffmärkten oder anderen 
Politiken.  
Hinsichtlich des ES-Konzeptes legt die Arbeit dar, dass das ES-Konzept 
bisher nicht vollständig in den Umwelt und Agrarumweltpolitiken der EU, der 
nationalen Mitgliedstaaten und der USA integriert wurde, eine Integration 
aber fortschreitet. Dem ES-Konzept wird ein großer Einfluss auf die 
Wahrnehmung, Präferenzen und Werte der Akteure zugesprochen, welcher 
zu einem ökosystembezogeneren Ressourcenverständnis führen kann, bei 
dem verschiedene Win-win-Situationen und Trade-offs betrachtet werden. 
Die Implementierung des Konzeptes wird auf der einen Seite große sektor- 
und ebenenübergreifende Kooperationen erfordern. Auf der anderen Seite 
kann das ES-Konzept solche Kooperationen auch erleichtern. Der größte zu-
künftige Einfluss wird für die Klima- und Agrarpolitik vorausgesagt, 
insbesondere für schon bestehende Zahlungsmechanismen. Dabei wird ange-
nommen, dass das ES-Konzept verstärkt in die schon bestehenden 
Zahlungssysteme der Agarumweltmaßnahmen integriert wird (Diese sind 
schon Teil einer breiten PES Definition). Das ES-Konzept kann dabei genutzt 
werden, um Zahlungen für den landwirtschaftlichen Sektor zu erklären und zu 
legitimieren. Es wird ferner diskutiert, inwieweit auf dem ES-Konzept ba-
sierende Agrarumweltmaßnahmen zielgerichteter gestaltet werden können 
und eine Zusammenarbeit zwischen Umweltsektor und landwirtschaftlichem 
Sektor verbessert werden kann. 
Zusammenfassend lässt sich sagen, dass staatliche PES unerlässliche Ele-
mente in einem gegenwärtigen umweltpolitischen Instrumentenmix in 
Industriestaaten sind. Hierbei sind insbesondere Zielgerichtetheit und Inte-
gration der PES wichtig. So zum Beispiel die Abstimmung der EU 
Agrarumweltmaßnahmen mit der EU Wasserpolitik. Die Entscheidung, ob bes-
timmte Zahlungen für die Umsetzung einer Maßnahme oder 
ergebnisorientiert für die Leistung erbracht werden soll, muss sorgsam unter 
Abwägung der Gesamtumstände getroffen werden. Ein großer Forschungsbe-
darf besteht hinsichtlich der Verknüpfung von unterschiedlichen 
Instrumenten (Instrumentenmix), sowohl von PES-Instrumenten miteinander 
als auch mit anderen Steuerungsinstrumenten der Umwelt- und Agrarum-
weltpolitik. Für einen funktionierenden Instrumentenmix von PES mit 
Regularien sowie von PES mit Einkommensunterstützung (Sozialpolitik), 
müssen die jeweiligen Eigentumsrechtsituationen, der Referenzpunkt für die 




Abweichungen von einer Anwendung dieser Prinzipien transparent gemacht 
werden. Auch müssen für eine funktionierende PES-Integration verschiedene 
Akteure auf einer gemeinsamen Basis zusammenarbeiten. Diese gemeinsame 
Basis könnte das ES-Konzept sein. Demgemäß wird diskutiert, welches Poten-
tial das ES-Konzept dafür hat, die Kommunikation zwischen den 
verschiedenen Akteuren zu verbessern und neue Impulse für sektor- und 
ebenenübergreifende Kooperation zu geben, die zu einer Integration beste-
hender staatlicher PES (insbesondere Agarumweltmaßnahmen) führen kann. 
Schließlich wird argumentiert, dass eine systematische ES Untersuchung und 
Quantifizierung bessere Möglichkeiten für die Zieldefinition und das Monitor-
ing bieten könnte. Eine ökonomische Bewertung und Monetarisierung von ES 
ist dagegen nicht notwendig und die Anwendung dieser Ansätze sollte sorgfäl-
tig geprüft werden. Das Potential solcher Methoden, in bestimmten 
Situationen hilfreiche Lösungsansätze zu bieten, sollte aber auch nicht voll-
ständig vernachlässigt werden.  
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M e y e r ,  C . , Reutter, M., Matzdorf, B., Sattler, C., Schomers, S. (2015). 
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S h o r t  s u m m a r y :  We conducted a comparative analysis of agri-environmental 
measures’ (AEMs) institutional arrangements by examining 49 German cases. We 
analyzed the effects of rule combinations on the success of AEMs. The different 
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Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). Our results show that combinations of 
certain design rules, such as environmental goal targeting and area targeting, con-
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interests. We found EU CC, as payments for public ES do not generally align with 
the existing German property rights distribution and may cause changes in values 
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Humankind depends on ecosystems. Interrelations among ourselves and 
ecosystems are governed through institutions in the form of rules and con-
ventions (Vatn, 2010, 2005).1 Thus, the governance of ecosystems involves 
the formation of institutional structures based on social priorities about natu-
ral resource use and coordination (Vatn, 2005).2 In turn, the state of 
ecosystems always depends on the developed institutional structures (Prager, 
2010). As ecosystem goods are often common or public goods, governments3 
strongly influence the institutional structures of ecosystem governance 
(Matzdorf et al., 2013). However, the existing institutional structures for eco-
system governance are frequently unable to address ecosystem 
interdependencies in terms of trade-offs and synergies between environmen-
tal goals. Furthermore, fundamental coordination problems with private 
ownership interests and corresponding externality issues have been recog-
nized (Vatn, 2010). 
1.1 Research background 
In recent years, there have been several attempts to enhance the focus of 
environmental governance on ecosystem interdependencies – in science as 
well as in practical environmental governance. Several scientific concepts and 
political initiatives that aim at a more comprehensive management of natural 
resources have appeared (Moss, 2012; Folke, 2006; Young, 2002). One ap-
proach, arising from ecological science, taken up by economics, and finding its 
way into the policy arena, is the Ecosystem Services (ES) concept (Gómez-
Baggethun et al., 2010). Encompassing different ideas, the ES concept is dis-
cussed as a breakthrough approach to enhance the view on ecosystems, the 
  
1 Thereby, I do not simply see institutions as constraints on individual interaction but as 
influencing the individual as well as the individual’s values and preferences (cf. Vatn, 2005, 
2011). 
2 Governance is about the establishment and change of institutional structures for the o r-
ganization of natural resource use, taking into account social priorities, conflict resolution, 
and human coordination (Vatn, 2010; Paavola, 2007; Bromley, 1991). 
3 I take a broad understanding of government, including legislative, executive, and judicial 
authority at all governmental levels as well as the supranational European Union, which ex-
ercises transferred national executive powers. Therefore, the EU may only take action if the 
nation-state EU members cannot achieve certain measures at the member-state level (Arti-
cle 5, Treaty on European Union, see also Paper 3: p. 512).  
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environment, and environmental governance. Generally, the ES concept seeks 
to explain the importance of ecosystems to humans in terms of provisioning 
human needs and demands, and the corresponding effects of human activity 
on ecosystems and their provisioning function (Braat and de Groot, 2012). 
Thus, ES may be understood as an explanatory concept. Ecosystem Services 
have been broadly defined as benefits that people obtain from ecosystems in 
the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA, 2005)4, including provisioning, 
regulating, cultural, and supporting services.5 Combined with the general ide-
as shaping our economic system, the ES concept, which supports a rather 
anthropocentric and utilitarian understanding, led to the scientific idea of 
Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES), which is acknowledged as an innova-
tive and useful governance solution to resource coordination problems. 
Payments for Ecosystem Services have been defined as a voluntary transac-
tion wherein a well-defined ecosystem service is bought by a buyer from a 
service provider if he/she can secure its provision (Wunder et al., 2008). This 
development paralleled the recent tendency in environmental governance to 
prefer economic incentive-based instruments.6  
To solve coordination problems with ownership interests, governments in-
creasingly rely on paying land users to change their environmental behaviors 
to reduce negative externalities or increase positive externalities, in addition 
to or instead of regulation (Baylis et al., 2008). In terms of governmental PES, 
two developments can be observed. On the one hand, an academic and theo-
retical PES concept closely connected to the ES concept has entered the 
policy arena and has been influencing state representatives’ ideas and actions 
regarding environmental policy development (Gómez-Baggethun et al., 2010). 
On the other hand, existing economic incentive-based instruments for natural 
  
4 ES definitions have evolved over time. For example, “Ecosystem Services are the conditions 
and processes through which natural ecosystems and the species that make them up, sustain and 
fulfill human life" (Daily, 1997: p. 3); “[f]inal Ecosystem Services are components of nature, di-
rectly enjoyed, consumed, or used to yield human well-being (Boyd and Banzhaf, 2007: p. 619); 
or “Ecosystem Services are the direct and indirect contributions of ecosystems to human well-
being” (TEEB Foundations, 2010: p. 33). 
5 Examples from the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA, 2005): (i) supporting services: 
nutrient cycling, soil formation, primary production; (ii) provisioning services: food, fresh 
water, wood and fiber; (iii) regulating services: climate and flood regulation, water purifica-
tion; (iv) cultural services: aesthetic, recreational, spiritual.  
6 Matzdorf et al. (2013: p. 57) see an increasing attention on PES, furthered by an ongoing 
worldwide degradation of biodiversity and ecosystem services as well as a current environ-
mental policy that cannot prevent climate change, and refer to IPCC (2013), MA (2005), and 
COM (2011). 
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resource management (such as agri-environmental measures) have signifi-
cantly influenced ideas of what PES are, could be, and should be (cf. Jack et al., 
2008; Matzdorf et al., 2013). Many of these ‘old’ instruments, however, do not 
focus on clearly defined ES in the abovementioned sense. Consequently, PES 
definitions were broadened to include existing governmental payments for 
the internalization of negative externalities and production of positive exter-
nalities (cf. Muradian et al., 2010; Vatn, 2010). Furthermore, the juxtaposed 
tendencies are not independent but can instead be perceived as elements of a 
continuous overall process of defining and concretizing PES schemes. Corre-
spondingly, in terms of governmental policy instruments, new PES programs 
have been created, especially in developing countries (cf. Corbera et al, 2007), 
while in developed countries, a broad range of existing governmental econom-
ic incentives was reclassified as governmental PES. For the most part, existing 
extensive agri-environmental payment programs in the EU and US have been 
subsumed under the term PES scheme (Schomers and Matzdorf, 2013).  
Even though the largest governmental PES can be found in the EU and US, 
reaching many actors and covering vast areas, much of the existing research 
under the PES label has focused on developing and transitioning countries (cf. 
Corbera et al., 2007; Pagiola et al., 2008). Although PES research in devel-
oped countries is comparatively less established, there is literature on agri-
environmental payment schemes (without PES framing) that focuses im-
portant aspects of the PES discourse (e.g., targeting, remuneration, or 
additionality). Thus, agri-environmental payment schemes appear to be valua-
ble research objects for governmental PES in developed countries. 
Furthermore, I see a great need for EU and US agri-environmental policy re-
search integration because, on the one hand, the international PES discourse 
could profit from such exchange (Schomer and Matzdorf, 2013) and, on the 
other hand, the PES discourse could significantly add to the research on agri-
environmental payments. To integrate research on agri-environmental pay-
ments and PES, an encompassing investigation of the ES concept’s influence 
on environmental and agri-environmental policies appears particularly crucial.  
1.2 Research objectives 
Against the backdrop of the prominence of agri-environmental payments, 
understood as governmental PES (Baylis et al., 2008), and the increasing im-
pact of the ES concept in EU and US environmental and agri-environmental 
policies (cf. Hauck et al., 2013; Salzman, 2005), in this dissertation, I aim to 
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investigate and improve the understanding of governmental PES in developed 
countries from an institutional economics point of view. The research back-
ground outlined above, especially the juxtaposed tendencies within societal 
and political process of defining and concretizing PES, led to various questions 
for different individual aspects of PES and ES as parts of broader structures 
for ecosystem management and in terms of their direct relationship. Thus, on 
the one hand, I will address the governmental agri-environmental payment 
instruments that were created before the development of the ES concept but 
are now defined as PES.7 On the other hand, I will address the ES concept’s 
effects on existing instruments and their further development. The focus will 
be on the institutional design and performance of existing governmental PES 
in terms of ecosystem management and ownership interests as well as the 
performance of PES within broader structures for ecosystem management. 
Further, the main elements of the ES concept in terms of environmental policy 
and impact on environmental policies design and performance will be ad-
dressed. Correspondingly, I focus on two general research objectives: 
§ O b j e c t i v e  A :  To understand how existing governmental PES are institu-
tionally designed and how they perform. 
§ O b j e c t i v e  B :  To understand the relevance of the ES concept for public 
environmental policy, especially for governmental PES. 
1.3 Structure and organization 
The two general research objectives have been targeted by individual pub-
lications (see Annex). Overall, the research conducted for five peer-reviewed 
publications added significantly to my understanding of the overall issues (see 
Fig. 1). Thereby, three papers (cited here as Paper 1, Paper 28, and Paper 3) 
  
7 Governmental agri-environmental payment instruments that were created before the de-
velopment of the ES concept have been included in my PES definition (see sec. 2.2), even if 
many of these instruments do not focus on clearly defined ES. Throughout my thesis, I 
sometimes refer to PES and sometimes to agri-environmental payments to describe the 
same existing instruments, depending on the respective context.  
8 Paper 2 compares EU/German governmental agricultural Cross Compliance mechanisms 
and Compliance Payments in the US. Cross Compliance/Compliance payments essentially 
encourage farmers to fulfill certain environmental conditions in return for governmental 
support payments. Even if agricultural Cross Compliance/Compliance payments may not be 
seen as a classical PES mechanism, I included it in my analysis. The mechanism is well suited 
to consider issues of multi-targeted PES (combining environmental and social goals) as well 
as payments’ interplay with regulations and property rights distributions. 
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depict the specific issues of my doctoral thesis in depth. Two additional publi-
cations provide a broader overview of PES design in general (cited as Paper 4) 
and of governmental PES integration into environmental policy (cited as Paper 
59).  
 
Figure 1: Paper contributions to research objectives 
 
Each paper focuses on a particular topic, which mainly contributes to one of 
the two objectives. Jointly, these papers provide important contributions to 
each objective. Within this dissertation framework, the contributions of the 
individual paper results to the general research objectives are depicted in de-
tail. Therefore, I substantiate the overall objectives through more specific 
research questions that are broadly based on institutional economics theory, 
which then are answered based on the content of the five papers. In particu-
  
9 Through Paper 5, I link the ideas of my preceding master’s thesis on institutional change in 
ecosystem management and my basic knowledge of the impact of governmental PES on en-
vironmental policy implementation as well as of the influences of informal rules and mental 
models on environmental governance to the investigation of governmental PES design and 
performance (see also, Preface). 
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lar, additional work is used to discuss my findings from the US, EU, and Ger-
man environmental and agri-environmental policies.  
In Section 2, I will present the state of the art. Taking my starting point into 
account, the initial scientific emphasis on ES, and the juxtaposed tendencies 
within the definition and concretization process of PES specified above, I will 
explain the ES concept’s development and then turn to the understanding of 
governmental PES and its performance, as this procedure facilitates the 
presentation of the overall picture. In Section 3, I will concretize the individual 
research questions based on institutional economics ideas. In Section 4, I will 
present my answers to the raised questions. Finally, in Section 5, the results 
will be discussed. Section 6 concludes the dissertation.  
2 The ES concept and governmental PES: State of the art  
Humans live within a common natural environment and resources are 
shared. Thereby, “[t]he way we think about the environment and the interactions 
between the environment and the economy must certainly influence the way we 
treat it” (Vatn, 2005: p. 231) and impact other individuals. The understanding 
of these interactions is changing continuously. Recently, the fact that econom-
ics and environmental conservation have been treated separately has been 
critically highlighted (Gómez-Baggethun and Ruiz-Pérez, 2011). The concept 
of ES may offer a partial solution (Folke, 2006). As humans depend on com-
mon environmental resources and their functions, the dependence can be 
framed in terms of ES (Vatn, 2010). Societal goals in terms of ES distribution 
and provision may be reached through various policy measures and mixes 
thereof. The main different types of public policies have been characterized as 
regulations, economic instruments, and information (Vedung, 2009). Regula-
tory approaches have been especially criticized for their lack of 
implementation (Engel and Zimmermann, 2007) as well as their cost-
effectiveness deficits (Stavins, 2000), which are expected to be solved by eco-
nomic instruments. Thus, governments have increasingly focused on the 
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implementation of economic incentive-based instruments, especially PES.10 
Further, the inclusion of the ES concept in governmental policies has been 
discussed (Martin-Ortega, 2012; Hauck et al., 2013). Although there is much 
enthusiasm, there is also considerable criticism of ES, neoliberally oriented 
PES, and the institutionalization of these concepts (Norgaard, 2010; Kosoy 
and Corbera, 2010). While the enthusiasm is grounded in a widely assumed 
compatibility of the ES concept – and accordingly, PES – with environmental 
governance in the prevalent economic system (cf. Gómez-Baggethun et al., 
2010), the criticism involves mainly social and ethical aspects, which are often 
grounded in scientific and technical limitations (cf. Jax et al., 2013; Redford 
and Adams, 2009).  
2.1 Development of the ES concept  
Defining nature-society relationships 
The ES concept involves a certain way of looking at the world by assessing 
nature-society relationships. In terms of a conceptual view, Potschin and 
Haines-Young (2011) describe something of a production chain linking eco-
logical and biophysical structures and processes on the one hand, and, 
elements of human well-being on the other and argue that, potentially, a se-
ries of intermediate stages between them exists. Different definitions have 
evolved over time, with varying focus on more ecological or more economic 
interpretations of the concept (summarized by Braat and de Groot, 2012: p. 
5). The discussion in terms of different perceptions of ecological and econom-
ic issues continues (cf. Boyd and Banzaf, 2007; Fisher et al., 2009; Farley, 
2012; Lele et al., 2013; Fisher and Brown, 2014). From the initial ecological 
perspective, the limitedness of natural resources and the analysis of nature’s 
role in economic and social dynamics led to a demonstration of the importance 
of nature’s functions for humans (Spangenberg et al., 2014; Braat and de 
Groot, 2012 referring to, for example, Carson, 1962, Ehrlich, 1968, and 
  
10 Pirard (2012) reviews economic incentive based instruments and categorizes the differ-
ent heterogeneous approaches as direct markets, tradable permits, reverse auctions, 
Cosean-type agreements, regulatory price signals, voluntary price signals. Governments 
especially draw back on what he calls tradable permits (e.g. emission quotas in the European 
ETS, Individual Transferable Quotas for fisheries) and regulatory price signals (e.g. eco-tax, 
agro-environmental measures). 
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Meadows et al., 1972). In the second half of the 20th century, economists be-
gan to explain and assess the undervaluation of ecosystem contributions to 
welfare. Gómez-Baggethun et al. (2010) show the continuous development of 
the scientific ES framework toward economic decision making, from the inclu-
sion of the idea of the values of nature’s functions (e.g., King, 1966; Helliwell, 
1969) to the utilitarian, economic framing of ecological concerns (e.g., West-
man, 1977; de Groot, 1987). Mainstreaming of the scientific discourse has 
been driven by the publications of de Groot (1992), Daily (1997), and espe-
cially, Costanza et al.’s (1997) paper on the economic value of global natural 
capital.  
Entering the policy agenda 
In the new millennium, the ES concept appeared on the international policy 
agenda (e.g., MA, 2005), manifesting the concept’s importance for policies and 
defining ES as “the benefits people obtain from ecosystems” (MA, 2005: vi; cf. 
Fisher and Brown, 2014). An exponentially increasing literature addressing ES 
in some form can be found (Fisher et al., 2009). Global problems have also 
been framed as ES-based and in economic terms, as by the Stern Review on 
Economics of Climate Change11, the Cost of Policy Inaction study by the EU 
(Braat and ten Brink, 2008), and The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiver-
sity (TEEB,  2010). Recently, the concept has floated into national 
environmental policies (Paper 3; Hansen et al., 2015; Hauck et al., 2013; Mar-
tin-Ortega, 2012). The increasing policy focus on the value of ecosystem 
services has in turn been understood as a promotion of ES as a paradigm for 
environmental management (Norgaard, 2010). In this regard, Norgaard 
(2010) summarizes, “[o]ver a period of about 15 years, an eye-opening metaphor 
intended to awaken society to think more deeply about the importance of nature 
and its destruction through excessive energy and material consumption trans-
formed into a dominant model for environmental policy and management … for the 
globe as a whole.” Correspondingly, the interest of policy makers in economic 




11 Sir Nicholas Stern, Head of the Government Economic Service and Adviser to the Gov-
ernment on the economics of climate change and development, led a major review on the 
economics of climate change to comprehensively show the nature of the economic challeng-
es and how they can be met (http://goo.gl/9DeRGG). 
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Advantages and disadvantages 
Fisher and Brown (2014) argue that economic approaches apply the ES 
concept as a utilitarian and anthropocentric concept. Risks have been ob-
served regarding a possible outweigh of noneconomic justifications for 
conservation, ignorance of the economically irrelevant parts of the ecosystem, 
and a mismatch in or lack of institutions available for value realization (Red-
ford and Adams, 2009). Against such arguments, it has been noted that the 
concept expands the audience for conservation messages and does not dimin-
ish the non-economic values and arguments, but simply expresses it in other 
ways (Skroch and López-Hoffman, 2010). Independently from economic ideas, 
the ES concept has been observed as a helpful communication tool to explain 
the dependence of human life on ecosystems (Redford and Adams, 2009), with 
the potential to evaluate the existence values of land or biota in cultural or 
social terms, targeting and prioritizing resource management (Skroch and 
López-Hoffman, 2010; Farley, 2012). However, independently of economiza-
tion, other problems with the concept have been acknowledged, such as its 
general support of a human-centered worldview, lack of intrinsic values (Fish-
er and Brown, 2014), reduction of holistic ideas (Adams and Redford, 2010) 
and blinding effect toward natural system complexity (Norgaard, 2010). Cor-
respondingly, in recent years, there have been concrete advances in practical 
applications, methods for identification and quantifications of ES, models, and 
indicators (cf. Braat and de Groot, 2012).  
2.2 Governmental PES  
Coasean or Pigouvian  
Initially, the scientifically shaped PES idea was closely linked to the ES idea, 
ideal markets, and so-called Coasean market solutions to environmental is-
sues (Coase, 1960; see also Vatn, 2010), focused on direct negotiations 
between parties to improve efficiency (Pasqual et al., 2010; Engel et al., 
2008). The approach is underpinned by environmental economic ideas that 
see environmental degradation results from market failure caused by envi-
ronmental externalities and free-riding (van Hecken and Bastiaensen, 2010). 
The corresponding definition understands PES as a voluntary transaction re-
garding a well-defined ES (or a land-use likely to secure it), which is being 
bought by one or more ES-buyers from one or more ES-providers if condition-
ality is on hand (Wunder, 2005: p. 3). The definition has been broadened over 
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time, partly because of its little practical relevance (definition overviews can 
be found in Muradian et al., 2010; Matzdorf et al., 2013; Derissen and Latacz-
Lohmann, 2013; Wunder, 2015). Different mixed-type governance structures 
relating to Pigouvian ideas based on environmental taxation and subsidization 
to correct market externalities have been included (see Pigou, 1920; Baumol, 
1972; in general Schomers and Matzdorf, 2013). Such a conceptualization of 
PES extends it to include any financial incentive to correct environmental ex-
ternalities, for example, Muradian et al. (2010: p. 1205) understand PES “as a 
transfer of resources between social actors, which aims to create incentives to align 
individual and/or collective land use decisions with the social interest in manage-
ment of natural resources”.12  
The state is the buyer 
Governance has been defined as the establishment and change of institu-
tional structures for the organization of natural resource use (cf. Fn. 2; Vatn, 
2010; Paavola, 2007; Bromley 1991). Vatn (2010) identifies three main types 
of governance structure, hierarchies, markets, and community management, 
and emphasizes that mostly all types operate together. Within the diverse ex-
isting PES governance structures, the state and hierarchies (command 
systems, bureaucracy, and distribution of public funds13) may play an im-
portant role (Vatn, 2010; Corbera et al., 2007; Salzman, 2005). Matzdorf et al. 
(2013) developed a framework to assess the diverse types of PES governance 
structures, focusing on the government’s key role as a legal driver of ES de-
mand and/or as an ES buyer (Figure 2).  
 
  
12 Criticism of Muradian et al’s (2010) definition has been expressed by Matzdorf et al. 
(2013: 58-59) who see the specification of well-defined ES (including biodiversity goals) as 
an essential criterion for payment under the PES approach, even if the payment is then 
made for an activity thought to deliver the ES (input-based). They emphasize that the speci-
fication of a clear ES objective is important to distinguish PES from more conventional 
Integrated Conservation and Development Projects (ICDPs) and from the broad variety of 
agricultural subsidies.  
13 Vatn (2010: 1246) defines a hierarchy as system of command where the power of decision 
rests with top level, including the capacity to command agents at subordinate levels. He 
understands bureaucracy as the dominant form of a governance hierarchy in modern socie-
ties and the basic system of allocation through distribution of common funds.  




Figure 2: PES governance model (following Matzdorf et al., 2013: p. 60) 
 
For my thesis, I apply a broad definition of PES (cf. Muradian et al., 2010) 
and assume that governmental PES schemes are those in which the state acts 
as a buyer of ES (cf. Vatn, 2014). Thus, I include existing Government-financed 
payments and Compensation payments for legal restrictions (Matzdorf, 2013, Fig. 
2). The relevance of such payments in PES research and development has 
been shown by Schomers and Matzdorf (2013), who state that most of the 
existing literature refers to large, national governmental payment programs. 
Even if many of US and EU programs are not labeled as PES schemes, the un-
derlying economic mechanisms correspond to such payment programs that 
have been extensively promoted as ‘novel’ PES approaches in the Latin Ameri-
can context as well as to Chinese environmental payments, which are 
generally based on regulations and quotas (Schomers and Matzdorf, 2013). In 
particular, agri-environmental measures (AEM) in Europe, conservation pro-
grams in the US (Baylis et al., 2008; Claassen et al., 2008), Payments for 
Environmental Services (PSA) in Costa Rica (Pagiola et al., 2008)14, and Pay-
ments for Hydrological Environmental Services (PSAH) in Mexico (Muñoz-
  
14 At least in parts, PSA have also been understood as a kind of compensation payments for 
legal restrictions  (cf. Schomers and Matzdorf, 2013). 
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Piña et al., 2008) can be understood as Government-financed payments. In cas-
es of Compensation payments for legal restrictions, the state regulates the 
production of negative environmental externalities but compensates the ful-
fillment of regulations, as in the cases of the EU Natura 2000 nature conser-
conservation areas, the EU Water Framework Directive (WFD) (Matzdorf et 
al., 2013) as well as in parts the Sloping Land Conversion Program (SLCP) in 
China (Xiong and Wang, 2010). 
2.3 Development and performance of existing governmental PES 
Public policy design 
The land use practices of landowners and their ES production are influ-
enced by a wide range of often-interrelated rules and policies (cf. Prager et al., 
2010; Corbera et al., 2009; Vatn, 2005). Basically, the design of such public 
environmental policies depends on the property regimes in place and policy 
choices, in turn, influence the rationalities and values of the actors. Different 
policies imply various possibilities for distribution and redistribution of rights, 
for example, the generation or internalization of externalities via contracts or 
government regulation (Vatn, 2005). By using contracts, the state may gener-
ate positive external effects by paying for the production of ES (Hampicke, 
1994). There are two possible solutions. One is the allocation of property 
rights by creating and paying for ES as commodities and establishing the nec-
essary economic incentives (cf. Baylis et al., 2008). The second and most 
common solution, especially in terms of agri-environmental payments, is pay-
ment for specific actions by a farmer that lead to greater ES production 
(Matzdorf, 2004). Payments for the reduction of negative externality produc-
tion remunerate the landowner for not negatively influencing an ecosystem’s 
ES production (Rodgers, 2009; Matzdorf, 2004). Agreements and government 
regulation can also be combined. The prevention of negative externality pro-
duction through regulation is supported by additional compensation payments 
(Matzdorf et al., 2013). In all cases, in my understanding of governmental PES, 
the state itself ‘buys’ the ES and is considered a “third party acting on behalf of 
service buyers” (Engel et al., 2008: 666). Therefore, governments organize the 
PES, set the prices, and substitute the demand side (Vatn, 2010).  
  




In case of Government-financed payments (cf. Fig. 2), the government essen-
tially provides payments to land users who voluntary promote environmental 
objectives beyond existing legal requirements (Matzdorf, et al. 2013). Thus, 
the design of PES is initially subject to the ownership of the relevant re-
sources and the owner’s rights to use them (Vatn, 2010). In addition to 
organizing public ES production, governments may be driven by additional 
motives for payments and their organization (Baylis et al., 2008), and there-
fore, governmental PES often do not focus on conditionality (Matzdorf et al., 
2013). Thus, Baylis et al. (2008) see agri-environmental payments in the US 
and EU as examples of paying farmers for ES by transferring public funds. 
Correspondingly, the remuneration plays a crucial role. The two extremes are 
payments for outputs of measured ES or payments for inputs or technology 
use (Baylis et al., 2008).15 Thereby, many governmental PES are ‘take it or leave 
it contracts’ without an opportunity to negotiate the contract terms (Mette-
penningen et al., 2009: p. 652) and do not constitute a market (cf. Vatn, 2014). 
In the case of Compensation payments for legal restrictions (cf. Fig. 2), states use 
legal requirements to reach environmental goals. Specific forms of resource 
use and ES provisions are obligatory. Moreover, the state pays to compensate 
land users for equity concerns or to improve the acceptance of and compli-
ance with the regulations (Matzdorf et al., 2013). The latter especially occurs 
due to the difficulty of implementing regulations (such as the polluter pays 
principle) due to long histories of agricultural income support (Baylis et al., 
2008) and corresponding path dependencies. 
PES performance 
In general, the performance of PES has been broadly analyzed within dif-
ferent settings, exhibiting strengths, weaknesses, and limitations as well as 
issues of implementation (cf. Kemkes et al., 2010; Muradian et al., 2010; Vatn 
2010; Kosoy and Corbera, 2010; Fisher et al., 2009; Engel et al., 2008; 
Wunder et al., 2008). Furthermore, particular questions on governmental 
PES, regarding their role and performance as environmental policy instru-
ments, have been studied, especially in terms of effectiveness and efficiency. 
For agri-environmental payments, our main PES cases, various analyses show 
  
15 PES schemes may be input-based, also called activity-based, or else output-based, also 
called performance-based or result-oriented  (Matzdorf et al., 2013: p. 58). 
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environmental effects (e.g., Carey et al., 2005; Kleijn et al., 2006). According 
to Uthes and Matzdorf (2013), it is usually questioned whether agricultural 
practices that are supposed to deliver environmental effects or to protect cer-
tain habitats are effectively targeted. Quite a few suggestions on how to im-
improve such schemes have been made. The effects of farmer’s participation 
in and adoption of schemes may be influencing factors (Schomers et al., 2015; 
Mettepenningen et al., 2013) in addition to the impacts of spatial targeting 
(Uthes et al., 2010; van der Horst, 2007; Latacz-Lohmann and Hodge, 2003) 
and remuneration alternatives (e.g., input-based, output-based, auctions) 
(Klimek et al., 2008, Bertke et al., 2008; Claassen et al., 2008). Different ac-
tors from the government (environmental and agricultural entities) and non-
governmental organizations may be involved in the agri-environmental design 
and decision-making processes and may influence performance at various 
scales (Uthes and Matzdorf, 2013), for example, through cooperation (Prager 
and Freese, 2009) or advice (Sutherland et al., 2013).  
3 Framing research on governmental PES  
Both enthusiasm and criticism regarding PES are related to central ques-
tions of environmental policy: Who does or has to do what, how, and why? 
Who pays or has to pay whom, for what, and why? Answers to these questions 
depend on the institutional context (cf. Vatn, 2005, also Paper 2). In this the-
sis, I understand institutions as the conventions, norms, and legal rules that 
guide human interactions, from facilitating coordination to conflict resolution 
(Vatn, 2011), and I broadly framed the objectives against an institutional eco-
nomics background. 
3.1 Theoretical background 
Within institutional economics, assumptions about individuals, behaviors, 
and the development of institutions differ (Vatn, 2005). Corresponding to in-
dividual journal articles, my analysis is generally based on the economic 
institutionalist perspectives introduced by Vatn (2005, 2009) and Bromley 
(1989, 1990), who understand institutional change as instances of social and 
political contexts rather than as results of utility maximizing, rational individ-
uals. Thus, institutional development and change are understood as products 
of the control and power of the involved actors. One individual’s actions influ-
ence the opportunities of others (cf. Vatn, 2005). Individuals are seen as 
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multi-rational with context dependent preferences and values (Vatn, 2005). I 
further recognized formal and informal institutions that structure the rela-
tions among individuals and natural resource use (Vatn, 2005). Property 
rights, as a subset of institutional structures, define access to and use of re-
sources (cf. Bromley, 1991).  
Environmental management depends on various institutional arrange-
ments16 at different scales of socio-political organization that interact with 
each other (Berkes, 2002). Policy measures may be perceived as institutional 
arrangements for reaching certain societal goals. The use of complex, inter-
connected natural resources results in external effects that may be addressed 
by institutional arrangements setting demarcations. However, demarcations 
can only be partial and are dependent on existing institutional structures and 
power relations (Vatn, 2005, elaborated in Paper 2). Thus, public policy design 
implies institutional development and change dependent on the institutional 
context and prevalent power structures. For example, the decision of how to 
distribute and redistribute use rights to internalize certain externalities via 
agreements or government regulation depends on the existing property rights 
situation as well as public perceptions of the environmental problem (cf. Vatn, 
2005). To concretize my general research objectives A and B, in the following, I 
focus on public policy institutional design and performance, which is enhanced 
by the crosscutting concept of interplay.  
3.2 Concretizing the research objectives  
Institutional design and performance 
Institutional design means modifying or replacing institutional arrange-
ments, if they are suspected sources of a problem, or creating incentives to 
cope with the bio-geophysical drivers, if the problems are based upon those 
(cf. Young, 2002). As described above, new institutional arrangements are in-
fluenced by existing institutions, individual preferences, and power relations 
(cf. Vatn, 2005). Young (2002) sees institutional design as especially con-
strained by limitations in the human ability to foresee institutional 
  
16 Institutional arrangements are understood as the institutional structures that regulate 
resource use, called resource regimes by Vatn (2005: p. 252). In general, “The structure of the 
relationships between the institutions involved in some type of common endeavour” (Imperial, 
1999: p. 454).  
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performance in complex systems. Most institutional arrangements are de-
signed to meet a goal, “the solution of more or less well-defined problems” 
(Young, 2002: p. 17). Accordingly, institutional performance analysis identi-
fies the extent of an institution’s contribution to achieving – or not achieving – 
a specific goal (Mitchell, 2008). An evaluation of institutional performance in 
terms of the set goals requires the definition of criteria against which the in-
stitution can be evaluated (Corbera et al., 2009). Due to the complexity of 
socio-economic systems, there are no best design solutions. However, several 
scholars tried to identify sets of functioning institutional design principles for 
collective natural resource management (cf. Corbera et al., 2009: p. 745; re-
ferring to the principles developed by Agrawal, 2002 and; Ostrom, 1990). 
Correspondingly, I refine objectives A and B (see Fig. 3) into two questions:  
 What are the relevant institutional design principles for reaching the en-
vironmental goals of governmental PES?  
 What are the institutional design principles of an ES-based policy, and 
where are they found in environmental policies? 
Thereby, it must be understood that even if a policy regime solves a well-
defined problem, there are often other social concerns to better use the same 
resources to solve other problems (Young, 2002). As to that, Vatn and Veldeld 
(2012) see strong normative elements in institutional design and perfor-
mance. Ecosystems are not fixed entities; the set goals will influence and 
change perceptions of problems and ideas of the biophysical system. Thus, for 
example, the measurement of values of ES requires institutions of criteria and 
indictors, which are influenced by the prevalent economy, culture, and biology 
(cf. Gatzweiler, 2014). Correspondingly, I finally refine Objective B (see Fig. 3) 
into a question about the ES concept’s influence on actor perceptions of bio-
physical systems and corresponding preferences and values:  
 Does the ES concept influence actors’ preferences and values?  
Institutional interplay 
The existing institutions as well as the values and preferences of the re-
source users will influence the design and performance of new institutional 
arrangements (cf. Vatn and Vedeld, 2012) and cause institutional interplay. 
The concept of institutional interplay cuts across institutional design and per-
formance, which complements our research focus. Figure 3 shows the 
specifications of the research goals against the background of design, perfor-
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mance, and interplay in the overview. As a cross cutting issue, institutional 
interplay concerns how institutions affect one another and how interactions 
between two or more institutions can influence outcomes (Corbera et al., 
2009). According to Young (2002), there are two different dimensions of in-
terplay. First, he distinguishes between horizontal (at the same level of social 
organization) and vertical (between different levels of social organization) 
institutional interplay. Second, he sees functional interdependence (two or 
more institutions are linked in biogeophysical or socioeconomic terms) and 
politics of design and management (intentionally forged links among institu-
tions) interplay. As to Corbera et al. (2009), questions following the interplay 
concept include whether PES influence or are influenced by other institutions 
and which types of synergies or conflicts exist. Institutional interplay may es-
pecially be triggered by different spatial, temporal, or functional relations of 
various interrelated institutional arrangements within environmental systems. 
Correspondingly, I refine objectives A and B (see Fig. 3) into two questions:  
 How do PES interact with other institutional arrangements? 
 How can ES-based rules interact with existing environmental policies, 
especially PES? 
Understanding the whole picture of interactions is regarded as important 
for managing institutional interplay (cf. Paavola et al., 2009). Young (2006) 
categorizes different general patterns of scale that depend on cross-level in-
terplay responses, such as dominance, separation, merger, negotiated 
agreement, or system change. Addressing institutional interplay through ne-
gotiated agreements could, for example, take place through new institutional 
arrangements, such as multi-stakeholder bodies or co-management organiza-
tions (cf. Berkes, 2002).  
  




Figure 2: Paper contributions to research questions 
 
4 Results on institutional aspects  
In the following, I will provide answers to the above questions by drawing 
on the results presented in my individual papers. Thereby, Section 4.1 ad-
dresses objective A, governmental PES design and performance, and Section 
4.2 addresses objective B, the relevance of the ES concept for environmental 
policy, especially PES. All findings will be presented and summarized in Table 
2. 
4.1 Governmental PES design, performance, and interplay 
Relevant PES design principles 
To answer the questions about the relevant institutional design principles 
to reach PES environmental goals, Table 1 presents four rules that shape gov-
ernmental PES (reviewed in Papers 4 and 1)17. Based on the basic elaborations 
  
17 I understand governmental PES as defined in Section 2.2. More specific information on the 
relevant rules and the reviewed literature can be obtained within section 2 of Paper 3  and 
section 2 of Paper 4.  
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in Paper 4 and the detailed review of AEM in Paper 1, different sets of institu-
tional design principles for governmental PES are identified (Paper 1). Two 
rule sets are found to be sufficient for environmentally effective PES: target-
ing only one environmental goal in addition to application to a certain ar-
area/habitat as well as an accessible advice system in combination with either 
flexible application or obligatory participation of a nature protection agency 
(Paper 1). Thus, I see the general importance of specific targeting, application 
feasibility for land users, information and advice. 
 
PES Rules ES types and 
environmental goals 







PES address single 
types of ES or ES 
bundles, single envi-
ronmental goals or 
bundles of goals (Pa-
pers 1 and 4) 
PES may be open to all 
ES providers and all 
areas, or targeted on 
specific providers or 







may be under the 
responsibility of one 
or more administra-
tive entities (Paper 1) 
A PES aim can be 
additionality of ES 
production, but also 
preservation of the 
status quo (Paper 4) 
Targeting may be 
performed by ES 
providers through 
application choices 
(e.g., area, practices, 
or times) (Paper 1) 
Payments are either 
for input (land-use or 
management activity) 
or output (measured 
ES) (Paper 4) 
Different governmen-
tal entities may be 
involved in PES design 
and implementation 
(Paper 1) 
A PES can have addi-
tional objectives 
beside environmental 
goals, e.g., social sup-
port (Papers 2 and 4) 
Also bundling PES 
may be targeted to 
more than one goal 
(Papers 1 and 4) 
Long-term contracts 









monitor and control 
(Papers 1 and 4) 
 
Table 1: Important design rules for governmental PES 
 
Furthermore, Paper 1 provides hints about the additional relevance of 
whole-farm multi-target approaches through the case of organic farming that 
is focusing on all farm areas and different environmental goals. This leads to 
two parallel routes for successful PES design: either focusing on one special 
environmental issue and a certain area/habitat (in combination with other de-
sign rules) or targeting all areas and multiple goals using a whole-farm 
approach. My results also indicate that a combination of specifically targeted 
PES and multi-target whole-farm approaches in a policy mix could be promis-
ing. Furthermore, the property rights situation is relevant to PES success. PES 
must be available for rights owners to ES/resources that are relevant to fulfill 
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the targeted environmental goals (Paper 1). In terms of remuneration, Paper 4 
discusses a link between output-based remuneration and PES success, even if, 
in practice, the number of output-based schemes remains small and the sam-
ple of Paper 4 does not allow generalization18. Output-based remuneration 
may be supported by the suggested design principles (see Discussion). More-
over, contract length may play a crucial role; if they are not safeguarded, ES 
providers might exit schemes, which may especially be a factor if there is in-
terplay with other policy goals (Paper 2). Finally, the integration of different 
actors and their knowledge is important for governmental PES success. Re-
garding agri-environmental payment design, Paper 1 generally finds positive 
influences in terms of existing agri-environmental advice19 and the participa-
tion of nature protection agency cooperation in implementation. Paper 4 also 
indicates that non-governmental intermediaries can play a crucial role in PES 
implementation and advice.  
PES interaction with other institutional arrangements  
To answer the question of PES interactions with other institutional ar-
rangements, I initially draw on property rights. Designing PES involves 
interplay with the existing property rights. The state may decide to change 
rights by regulations or by paying the land user for exercising or not exercis-
ing their existing use rights or privileges. Moreover, policy choices depend on 
actors’ control and power; preferences and values; and administration, en-
forcement, monitoring costs (Paper 2). Authority structures may not be able 
to enforce governmental regulations, or regulation may cause social re-
sistance. Therefore, payments may be intentionally used beside regulations 
(Paper 2 on EU Cross Compliance, cf. Fn. 19). Several arguments support such 
interaction, especially improved compliance or further institutional change. 
Possibly, land users may shift toward positive environmental behavior and 
rule acceptance (crowding in). Interaction could also imply crowding out ef-
fects: land users may assume that they retain use rights that regulatory laws 
have removed from their ownership bundle, as authorized by a socio-political 
decision to pay for ES. They may become reluctant to comply with laws or to 
  
18 The aim of the analysis was to classify a set of PES as successful. The sample is not based 
on representativeness in terms of all possible types of PES existing in reality. The overall 
number of cases did not allow for a statistical analysis. The findings are preliminary and 
must be supported by further research. 
19 Different types of advice services exist, as for example state agricultural offices, cham-
bers of agriculture, private advisory systems (Knuth and Knierim, 2013). 
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adopt management practices without payments, even if they would have done 
so without before (Paper 2). Furthermore, governmental PES are often func-
tionally linked to other environmental policies because they are highly 
relevant for the fulfillment of overall environmental goals, as in the case of EU 
and US agri-environmental measure. As segregated environmental policies 
often govern only one resource without including cross-sectoral cooperation 
(Paper 3 and 5), in cases where PES integration is required, formal and infor-
mal institutional change in response to interplay has been noticed, especially 
co-management tendencies, inter-organizational working groups and partici-
patory bodies (Paper 5). Finally, payments may intentionally combine 
environmental and social policies. Such policy combinations are, for example, 
used to reduce inconsistencies and/or generate justifications. The policy com-
binations could extend the inclusion of land users, spread environmental 
goals, save transaction costs, and close legislative deficiencies. A change in 
the perception of environmental problems may affect the behavior and ac-
ceptance of new rules (crowding in). However, if payment rules are decoupled 
from environmental goals, the resulting ES provision is strongly affected by 
other factors, such as price fluctuations in commodity markets or other poli-
cies fostering actions (Paper 2).20  
4.2 Relevance of the ES concept for environmental policy and PES 
Design of ES-based policies and presence in environmental policies 
To answer the question of institutional design principles for ES-based poli-
cy, Paper 3 makes suggestions for an ‘ideal’ ES concept-driven policy, 
including (i) rules directing attention to the capacity of ecosystems to supply 
goods/services and focus on maintenance/enhancement of ecosystem capaci-
ty; (ii) rules for identification of economic/social values of ecosystem 
structures/processes as policy goals, including monetary valuation and partic-
ipatory methods; (iii) rules to consider relationships/trade-offs among 
  
20 As described in Fn. 8, I use the institutional analysis of agricultural Cross Compliance 
(even if no classical PES mechanism) to present general issues of agri-environmental pay-
ments/PES that are combining environmental and social/income goals, as well as of 
payments’ interplay with regulations and property rights distributions. Thus, problems in 
terms of justifying income support with environmental goals, as well as the dependence on 
agricultural commodity markets, are also relevant in terms of AEM. PES interplay with regu-
lations concerns especially EU Natura 2000 payments.  
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environmental objectives and to foster cross-sector integration; and (iv) rules 
that enable financial incentive instruments, especially PES. To date, a general 
understanding of ecosystems as supporting economic activities and human 
well-being has been expressed in many public environmental policies. Yet, this 
understanding has only been used to describe the importance of nature ideal-
ly rather than to clearly define policy goals. Often, there are no rules that 
focus on ecosystem capacity, capacity thresholds or limits. In ‘classic’ envi-
ronmental policy, few instruments exist for social and/or economic valuation. 
The same applies to the considerations of ES interdependencies and trade-
offs (Paper 3). However, in agricultural and forest policies, there are often 
rules for payments, although the policies target also social and structural as-
pects besides environmental issues (Papers 1, 2, and 3). US Farm Bills and EU 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) are not completely ES-driven policies, but 
they integrate PES in a broad understanding even if payments are mainly not 
targeted to ES. Recently, the new CAP has focused on the delivery of public 
goods (equated to ES) as a main idea and explanation (Paper 3). 
ES concept influence on actor preferences and values 
The ES concept has generally been seen as a great influence on actor per-
ceptions of ecosystem dynamics, preferences and values, fostering an 
integrated ecosystem-based resource understanding and considering differ-
ent win–win and trade-off situations (Paper 3). As an example of the impact of 
institutionalization of concepts, ecosystem-focusing tendencies in the context 
of the EU WFD implementation process (even if it is not a completely ES-
driven policy) have already been observed. WFD’s strong focus on river basins 
(including ecosystem dynamics/capacity) has changed the perceptions and 
values of water managers in terms of spatial interrelations (Paper 5). In terms 
of recent ES concept influences on policy makers and administration, changes 
in economic and social value identification of ecosystems to supplying ser-
vices have begun and been acknowledged. Furthermore, US experts 
understood that the concept’s valuation and economic aspects will foster the 
importance of financial incentives and can influence individuals’ mental mod-
els in terms of seeing nature in a different way. Potential dangers of 
expanding the ES concept for the relationship of policy and ecosystem dynam-
ics have been observed in the lack of clear justifications for parts of 
biodiversity protection because not everything can be commodified (Paper 3). 
At the land user level, the influence of the ES concept has not yet been signifi-
cant. Generally, new ecosystem encompassing ideas, such as ecosystem-based 
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management of the WFD, may change attitudes, although this change may be 
generated by social pressure as well as economic incentives in addition to un-
derstanding. At large, I see strong differences in the mental models of 
different sectors, which might make it more difficult to integrate cross-
sectoral concepts (such as the ES concept)(Paper 5). Finally, experts have 
stated that people may also be concerned about the commodification of na-
ture and scrutinize ES-based polices (Paper 3).  
ES-based rules’ interactions with environmental policies 
To answer the question of how ES-based rules interact with environmental 
policies, especially existing payments schemes (defined as PES), I begin by 
drawing on experiences with EU WFD implementation. Implementing ecosys-
tem-based rules through segregated and single resource-oriented policies 
causes functional horizontal and vertical institutional interplay with existing 
institutional arrangements, which requires substantial coordination activities. 
To achieve coordination, existing institutional arrangements have been com-
plemented by new institutional arrangements, such as new inter-sectoral 
working groups (Paper 5). Similar actions have been foreseen in terms of ES 
institutionalization in existing policies – that is, broad horizontal and vertical 
interplay with other policies and broad cooperation and coordination re-
quirements (Paper 3). So far, the ES concept is already being used 
intentionally by policy makers and public administrators to reinterpret and 
reframe existing rules to develop new or to improve existing instruments. Yet, 
the interviewed US experts emphasized that existing legislation is insufficient 
for formal ES implementation, especially methods and rules for valuation. 
However, with respect to the integration of an ES concept into environmental 
policies, EU experts understand that ES can provide a conceptual bridge. First, 
bridging tendencies may be observed in the latest reform of the EU CAP, 
where communication of economic and social values and cross-sectoral coop-
eration are now framed through an ES understanding. Policy guidelines have 
been framed using the ES concept (e.g., EU Biodiversity Strategy). The first 
regulations are pending, and concept-oriented organizations (USDA Office of 
Environmental Markets) have been founded (Paper 3). Generally, the greatest 
future interaction is predicted regarding climate and agricultural policies, es-
pecially where PES already exist. ES-based ideas are assumed to be 
increasingly merged with governmental payments in the future to explain and 
legitimize financial support (Paper 3). The development of ES-based govern-
mental agri-environmental payments has the potential to foster collaboration 
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between the environmental and agricultural sector, for example, based on 
value communication as well as effectiveness and efficiency increases (Paper 
3). So far, most governmental payments do not explicitly target clearly defined 
ES. However, the potential for ES to better focus agricultural governmental 
PES schemes on the outcomes of the activities by developing metrics and cur-
rencies and to translate services and indicators for monitoring were 
emphasized by EU experts. The main challenge regarding an ES-based pay-
ment (input- and output-oriented), from both the technical perspective and 
public perception, has been seen in the actual design and integration of rules 
for valuation and commodification (Paper 3).  
 
Research Questions  Results 
What are the relevant 
institutional design princi-
ples for reaching the  
environmental goals? 
Two successful rules sets: single goal/area targeting + application flexibility + ad-
vice are important 
Multi-target approaches may be also important 
Eligibility of relevant rights holders can be relevant 
Contract lengths may be crucial  
Integration of different actors and knowledge can help 
How do PES interact with 
other institutional ar-
rangements? 
Payments complement environmental regulations 
Functional linkages of PES to other environmental policies 
Payments may combine environmental and income support (social) goals 
What are design principles 
of an ES-based policy and 
where are they found in 
environmental policies? 
Attention to ecosystem capacity, identification of values, ecosystem struc-
tures/processes as policy goals, consideration of relations/trade-offs, rules 
enabling financial incentive instruments 
So far, ecosystems seen as supporting economic activities and human well-being  
Few rules focusing ecosystem capacity, thresholds, limits;  few instruments for 
valuation 
US Farm Bills and EU CAP integrate payments/PES (often without ES quantifica-
tion and valuing) 
Does the ES concept influ-
ence actor’s preferences 
and values? 
General influence on actor’s perceptions, preferences, values 
Perceived mind change towards economic and social valuation  
Perceived lacking clear justification for conservation of parts of the nature  
Worries about commodification of nature 
How can ES-based rules 
interact with environmen-
tal policies, especially PES? 
Foreseen broad interplay among policies, broad cooperation/coordination re-
quirements 
So far, intentionally used to reinterpret and reframe of existing rules  
ES concepts principles can bridge policies themselves (communication, valuation) 
Usage for communication, explanation, legitimization, targeting of PES 
Main challenges: design and integration of rules for quantification and valuation 
 
Table 2: Summary of the results 
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5 Discussion  
My doctoral thesis contributes to the existing knowledge on governmental 
PES by addressing the topic from two sides. On the one hand, institutional de-
sign, performance, and interplay among existing governmental PES programs 
in developed countries have been examined. On the other hand, the relevance 
of the academic ES concept to overall environmental policy, especially to ex-
isting governmental payments, already defined as PES, and PES integration 
have been analyzed. Thereby, this thesis links two major perspectives on gov-
ernmental PES as described previously – one perspective being strongly 
driven by research on agri-environmental policies in the EU and US and the 
other perspective being influenced by recent research on ES and PES in an 
international context. In my thesis, different preferred rule sets for govern-
mental PES as well as interactions with other institutional arrangements have 
been shown (Papers 1, 2, 4 and 5). Furthermore, the implications of ES for en-
vironmental policy and governmental PES have been revealed (Papers 3, 5). In 
particular, Paper 3 notes that the ES concept is already entering national en-
vironmental and agri-environmental policies in the EU and US and that agri-
environmental policies with existing payments schemes (already defined as 
PES) will be among the first with the ES concept integrated (Paper 3). There-
fore, in the next chapter I will discuss what the ES concept offers 
governmental payments (defined as PES) development. Correspondingly, the 
results of favorable institutional arrangements and governmental PES inter-
play with other institutional arrangements will be first reflected on within a 
wider context of PES research in terms of improving governmental PES, and 
second, the ES concept will be added to the discussion, focusing on the poten-
tial benefits of the ES concept for governmental PES development.  
5.1 Governmental PES  
By taking into consideration my results on governmental PES, I argue that 
PES can be essential components within the overall environmental policy mix 
of developed countries. Generally, PES are not suited to replacing regulatory 
law but rather to complementing it (Matzdorf et al., 2014). They are especially 
important for the organization of societally required ES provision, if property 
rights are not allocated, or if current property rights distribution or non-
enforcement of rights do not enable meeting the societal demand for ES. It 
has been shown that the performance of PES depends on the institutional de-
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sign. Beyond the presentation of important sets of design rules for effective 
governmental PES, the results yield implications for further development of 
governmental PES design. In particular, this involves questions for the bene-
fits of multi-targeted and output-based PES schemes and for the integration 
of different actors and their knowledge in terms of providing advice as well as 
activating actors’ knowledge. Furthermore, my results reveal various ad-
vantages and disadvantages of using PES within a policy mix, for example at 
the nexus of regulations and PES, and through combinations of environmental 
and social goals. Correspondingly, I will discuss the following four major as-
pects in terms of governmental PES development: (i) targeting and 
remuneration of PES (ii) advice on PES, (iii) functional policy interaction, and 
(iv) intentional policy interaction. 
Targeting and remuneration of governmental PES 
First, the results of Paper 1 highlight the importance of targeting payments 
to achieve environmental effectiveness, as both presented successful rule 
sets promote targeting of only one environmental goal in combination with 
targeting a certain area/habitat. Further, I claim that Paper 1 indicates a com-
bination of payments that are targeted to one environmental goal and an 
encompassing whole-farm approach with multi-targets. The results corre-
spond to the findings of Schader et al. (2014) who demonstrate that multi-
target PES can be an efficient instrument in a policy mix. As only the whole-
farm measure organic farming is involved in our successful rule sets and no 
other broad extensification measures (cf. Feehan et al., 2005), I emphasize 
that further research is needed on the specific design of effective multi-target 
governmental payments, especially on whole-farm approaches. 
Second, my results generally support Moxey and White (2014) who see that 
improvements may not require output-based PES. It does not matter for envi-
ronmental effectiveness whether payment is provided for input or output, if 
the relevant design rules of the shown combinations, such as spatial targeting, 
monitoring and flexible implementation (Paper 1), will be met. However, even 
if our results do not show any relevance of output-based payments, I argue 
that the successful rule combination of targeting plus flexible application op-
portunities for land users, thus, making use of farmers’ knowledge and 
abilities (Paper 1), refers to particular properties of output-based approaches 
(cf. Matzdorf and Lorenz, 2010). Therefore, the second success-rule set from 
Paper 1 can be understood as supporting the implications of recent literature 
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in terms of positive correlations of output-based payments with effectiveness 
(Schroeder et al., 2013; Klimek et al., 2008).  
Overall, I see that targeting for effective schemes may take two different 
forms, which can be combined in a policy mix: specific single goal/area target-
ing and multi-targeting. Furthermore, the output- and input-basis of payments 
is not mutually exclusive mixed approaches may be considerable. Thus, the 
different targeting and remuneration possibilities can be observed as useful 
aspects for an overall environmental (agri-environmental) policy mix (cf. Mox-
ey and White, 2014; Matzdorf et al., 2014). The design of the payment must 
be customized to the specific socio-ecological situation. The design may de-
pend on the degree to which external influences on the provison of ES 
arecontrollable and foreseeable and on who will carry the risk (cf. Matzdorf et 
al., 2014). Both, strongly targeted input-based as well as output-based pay-
ments would need approved causal relationships and simple, reliable 
indicators to monitor (Uthes and Matzdorf, 2013; cf. Burton and Schwarz, 
2013). To this effect, our results show great hopes for the influence of the ES 
concept on the future design of governmental agri-environmental PES in the 
EU and US. At first, the concept has been seen as useful for framing targeting. 
However, Paper 3 shows that the ES concept has also been noticed as gener-
ally changing the policy focus from input- toward output-based payments, 
which will be discussed in the following. 
Advice on governmental PES  
Paper 1 underlines the importance of advice for which there are three main 
reasons: First, I see that economic factors can be drivers of participation in 
governmental PES, which often depends on transaction costs, such as infor-
mation gathering and ex-ante contract signing (Mettepenningen et al., 2009). 
Following Schomers et al. (2015), advisory services can help to lower such 
transaction costs and positively impact scheme uptake. Second, I recognize 
that new policies for more sustainable management will demand new technical 
knowledge and skills of land users (Ingram and Morris, 2007). Third, I argue 
that social reasons can play a major role as well. In this context, Moxey and 
White (2014) find that PES may rather depend on awareness of the purpose 
and judgment of success than on the actual payment. Thus, I assume that ex-
tension services and advisory support may sensitize land users to their 
societal role as well as help change perceptions of the environment. Moreo-
ver, this assumption corresponds with our results, which imply that despite a 
5  Discussion 
 
28 
measure’s high effectiveness in meeting ecological goals, the impact will be 
small if farmers are reluctant to adopt such measures (Paper 1).  
Diverse intermediaries provide advisory services, including non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), private consultancies, and governmental 
entities (Schomers et al., 2015; Sutherland et al., 2013)21. Regarding Paper 4, 
which highlights the importance of non-governmental intermediaries for PES 
in general, I see a possible strong role for civil society actors in terms of gov-
ernmental PES implementation. For example, due to regional knowledge, local 
networks, and direct contacts with farmers, these intermediaries enjoy more 
trust than do government actors. Moreover, they possess site-specific 
knowledge, may promote new approaches, and can give advice during partici-
pation (cf. Matzdorf et al., 2014). I argue that, thus far, research on advice for 
governmental PES remains very basic and that it must be greatly expanded. 
On the one hand, it could be important to examine the different functions that 
an advice system can accomplish to achieve protection goals or to advertise 
participation (see Paper 1). On the other hand, the required advisors’ skills 
and their formal involvement in the design and implementation are relevant as 
well (cf. Schomers et al., 2015; Moxey and White, 2014). In this context, the 
ES concept needs particular consideration to determine the extend to which it 
can support advice activities and institutions in terms of information costs, 
technical support, and social reasons, such as awareness creation through a 
common resource understanding or changed farmer self-concept.  
Functional policy interaction 
As a part of the overall environmental policy framework, governmental PES 
schemes interact with other public regulations in various ways. Interactions 
may, for example, result from certain external influences and requirements. 
Thus, Papers 2, 3, and 5 reveal that different policies guiding resource man-
agement strongly interact because they are segregated and are not suited to 
socio-ecological systems. Again, this may result in the high relevance of one 
  
21 For a broad range of examples see Garforth et al. (2003). For example, (i) Irish Agriculture 
and Food Development Authority Ireland (Teagasc), a semi-state body serving as the re-
search, advisory and training arm of the Department of Agriculture, Food and Rural 
Development; (ii) Farming and Wildlife Advisory Group UK (FWAG), a not-for-profit organi-
zation providing whole-farm conservation advice; (iii) DLV Adviesgroep NV The 
Netherlands, a private consultancy company, created from the former governmental agricul-
tural advisory service.  
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policy’s governmental PES for the fulfillment of another environmental poli-
cy’s goal, for example, in the case of EU water policy and agri-environmental 
policy interaction, where PES are essential for reaching water policy goals (cf. 
Paper 5). I perceive that due to segregated environmental policies, effective 
environmental targeting requires agency collaboration, which raisesthe ques-
tion of how to better integrate policy-making. One possibility is the official 
inclusion of different environmental sectors in PES implementation. For ex-
ample, the obligatory participation of nature protection agencies in agri-
environmental payment design and implementation, revealed as one rule for 
success in Paper 1. These results support Prager et al.’s (2012) general as-
sumption that collaboration can enhance implementation activities with 
respect to environmental effectiveness.  
If formal participation and collaboration among sector agencies is not yet 
institutionalized, functional institutional interaction can lead toward institu-
tional change and development in terms of new formal and informal 
cooperation and co-management, as shown in Paper 5. I demonstrate that in-
ter-sectoral collaboration implies high transaction costs, especially 
communication costs. Opposition is often created by different perspectives 
and mental models (cf. Galaz, 2005). Thus, the results indicate that a common 
understanding of the resource and its properties is crucial to collaboration 
among sectors and levels. The search for common denominators for communi-
cation about and understanding of ecosystem interdependencies appears to 
be a good starting point for improved policy integration. Therefore, the ES 
concept could present a considerable tool, which will be discussed in the fol-
lowing. Furthermore, Biddle and Koontz (2014) suggest that collaborative 
processes may have a beneficial effect on environmental outcomes by linking 
elements of collaborative processes with outputs and outcomes. The ES con-
cept may be considerable tool for this as well. 
Intentional policy interaction  
I agree that regulation is often mandatory to assure long term ecosystem 
and biodiversity protection. However, the involvement of governmental PES 
may provide many opportunities and increase flexibility. Establishing a func-
tioning interaction between regulatory environmental law and PES is 
extremely challenging (Matzdorf et al., 2014). Ideally, the policy mix should 
integrate the particular advantages of command-and-control and PES (cf. 
Klassert and Möckel, 2013). Thus, Paper 2 theoretically examines the thresh-
olds for rewarding ES provision in the case of agricultural EU and US Cross 
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Compliance based on institutional economics ideas, especially property rights 
theory. I revealed that despite the general understanding that payments 
should only be made for ES provisions that are not legally required, in prac-
tice, payments may be directly related to compliance with environmental law 
and do not fulfill the additionality premises (for Natura 2000 see also Klassert 
and Möckel, 2013; Matzdorf et al., 2014). Various advantages and disad-
vantages of such policy interactions have been presented and discussed in 
Paper 2. I argue that further in-depth research on the reciprocal influences of 
governmental PES and environmental regulation is urgently required. There-
fore, on the one hand, I support Rode et al.’s (2015) call for enhanced efforts 
in terms of the understanding of motivation crowding effects of economic in-
centives. On the other hand, I suggest an enhanced compliance analysis based 
on Similä et al.’s (2014) focus on the knowledge, motivations, and ability of the 
regulated. Particularly, in terms of a farmer’s position at the nexus of envi-
ronmental law and agri-environmental payments, the above-mentioned topics 
are rarely targeted, even if a general reluctance on the part of farmers to 
change their habits to conform to environmental law in terms of responsibility 
aversion and implementation resistance has been mentioned (cf. Barnes et al., 
2009, 2013). Research should especially consider both issues together, which 
could offer fruitful insights for optimizing the command-and-control PES poli-
cy mix.  
In addition to the interplay of regulations and payments, the second inten-
tional policy interaction revealed in Paper 2 is the combination of PES with 
social support policies, in the EU and US, especially farm income support. The 
combination of environmental and social goals is a major topic in the literature 
on development countries’ PES (cf. Bremer et al., 2014; Ingram et al., 2014; 
Corbera et al., 2007)22 but it is underrepresented in research on developed 
countries’ governmental PES. By broadly outlining and discussing related op-
portunities and pitfalls, Paper 2 points to two issues in particular: On the one 
hand, it reveals concerns regarding the creation of environmental justifica-
tions and legitimizations for income support. On the other hand, it reveals the 
problem of dependence of ES provision on external (agricultural) markets or 
  
22 Ingram et al. (2014) summarize that in developing countries PES have been understood as 
a potential mechanism for poverty reduction. Thereby they see that the usefulness of PES 
for supporting conservation and poverty reduction is especially appealing in places where 
both appeared incompatible and where PES may offer new and/or additional income oppor-
tunities for poor land-holders or –users who have only few other livelihood options. 
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other policy decisions. Both issues may only be solved when the individual 
goals, both environmental and social (such as income stability), are targeted 
more precisely. Initial, small attempts to better target the different payments 
have been described by Mann and Lanz (2013) for Switzerland, that is, label-
ing all public transfers as targeted to single societal deliveries. To sum up, I 
understand that for sound governmental PES design, the payment interplay 
with regulations (in terms of property rights distribution), the reference point 
for application of the ‘provider gets’-principle, and any deviations therefrom 
should be transparent, reasoned, and communicated to improve understand-
ing and legitimization of the payments. To this effect, it may also be 
considered the extent to which the ES concept could help to make explicit 
which payments are made for what and why. This will be discussed in particu-
lar below. 
5.2 The ES concept and governmental PES 
I previously discussed my results on existing governmental PES institution-
al design, performance, and interplay with a focus on PES improvement. 
Different development perspectives have been shown, regarding different 
forms of and needs for environmental targeting and remuneration, possible 
transaction cost reduction and preference changes through advice, as well as 
the demand for enhanced collaboration and communication rules and pro-
cesses for interlinking environmental policies. At the end of each subchapter, I 
have briefly mentioned the extent to which the ES concept could be consid-
ered a relevant solution for the raised issues. Thus, Paper 3 shows that ES is a 
concept that has been understood to shape environmental policies, especially 
agri-environmental policies, throughout the next decade. The concept will be 
used for communication, design, and indicators (cf. Paper 3). Building on this, 
in the following, I will deepen the discussion on the relevance of the ES con-
cept for the development of governmental PES. This corresponds to expert 
demands in the interviews conducted for Paper 3: policy-relevant discussions 
on how the ES concept could improve pre-existing environmental policies. 
Broadly, I see three relevant aspects of the ES concept for existing govern-
mental payments (defined as PES): (i) communication and cooperation for 
policy integration and advice (ii) definition of targets and quantification for 
effective and integrated PES, and (iii) valuation for renumeration and PES in-
tegration. In the discussion I will refer to each aspect of PES development 
raised above.  
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Communication and cooperation for policy integration and advice 
My results indicate that the ES concept has not been understood as a radi-
cal change but as a useful option for structuring thoughts, communicating 
goals as well as, providing a conceptual bridge, and new rationales. My find-
ings generally support Potschin and Haines-Young’s (2011) statement on the 
concept’s encouragement to re-examine the links among ecosystems and hu-
man well-being in a pragmatic way. In terms of goal communication, Paper 3 
reveals that EU and US agricultural policies, especially existing payments, as 
well as PES relationship to environmental policies, will initially be influenced 
by the ES concept. The EU CAP already implicitly uses the ES concept for 
communication through focusing on public goods. Thus, the question of what 
the influence will look like arises. I understand that the ES concept may be in-
creasingly used to explain and legitimize financial support for farmers (Paper 
3). Hereby, special attention must be paid to the nature of the explanations. If 
explanations involve a more precise demonstration of who pays for what, the 
ES concept may trigger a more transparent payment design and greater social 
acceptance. If, however, the concept is only used to label existing social sup-
port payments differently by generally referring to the ES-providing character 
of farmers’ activities, current failings will be maintained.  
In terms of its conceptual bridge character, I generally agree with Jax et al. 
(2013), who highlight the ES concept’s potential to foster and guide discours-
es about resource use among different actor groups. This has been confirmed 
by certain interviewed experts and has already started in the case of higher-
level national administrative cooperation. The concept has also given new im-
pulses for more cross-sectoral collaborations (e.g., through the USDA Office 
of Environmental Markets, Paper 3). Thereby, the concept of ES could provide 
an opportunity to make conflicting goals more coherent and to realize syner-
gies, for example, in terms of agricultural and water policies (Hauck et al., 
2013). Hence, the concept may be an appropriate tool to better integrate 
agri-environmental payments and environmental goals. However, the ad-
vantages of the ES concept, such as complexity reduction for higher 
administration levels communication and cooperation, may produce problems 
at the regional or local levels. Hauck et al. (2013) see limits, risks, and chal-
lenges in terms of lower level complex situations and confirm our results 
showing the demand ‘to bring the concept down to earth’ (Paper 3). In terms 
of providing new rationales, in principle, I see a potential to change ES provid-
ers’ preferences and values. Correspondingly, Matzdorf et al. (2014) argue 
5  Discussion 
 
33 
that the ES concept provides an opportunity to show farmers that they not 
only do affect ecosystems negatively, but also actively contribute to the pro-
vision of ES. Thus, they can become more than mere aid recipients by 
producing social benefits (cf. Plieninger et al., 2012). Thus, the concept may 
provide a useful tool to organize advice and initiate governmental PES uptake. 
In this context, furthermore, the analysis of the ES concept’s possible influ-
ence on existing strong reservations between environmental NGO’s and 
farmers (cf. Paper 5) appears a relevant future research concern.  
Overall, I understand that ES based complexity reduction on the one hand, 
may possibly lead to more encompassing perspectives on the other hand, in 
terms of higher-level resource management at the resource system or land-
scape level. Accordingly, I principally agree with Engel and Schaefer (2013) 
and Schröter et al. (2014) that emphasizing multiple ES and the trade-offs be-
tween can offer a more holistic perspective of resource management. 
Regarding the criticism of the ES concept’s anthropocentric framing, my law 
analyses (Paper 3) correspond partially to Hansen et al.’s (2015) findings on 
existing anthropocentric ideas in planning policy. Thus, I agree that the ques-
tion of whether the concept builds on existing views or really changes things 
remains. To this effect, my results especially confirm certain practical risks of 
ES concept policy integration in terms of human value changes toward com-
mercialization of nature and neglecting economically irrelavant parts of the 
ecosystem.23 These risks have already been criticized in literature and must 
always be carefully reflected within the communication and policy-making. 
Accordingly, various authors, such as Potter and Wolf (2014) for agri-
environmental administrations and Fisher and Brown (2014) for conservation 




23 Schröter et al. (2014: p. 516) clearly illustrate the controversy regarding the critique that 
ES is used as a conservation goal at the expense of biodiversity-based conservation and 
conservation strategies based on the ES concept might not safeguard biodiversity. As coun-
ter-arguments he invokes, amongst others, the overlaps acknowledged in Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment (MA) and The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity initiative 
(TEEB) as major influences for science and policy makers, growing empirical evidence on 
Biodiversity underpinning ES provision, as well as ES-based initiatives aim at broadening 
biodiversity practices. 
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ES targets and quantification for effective and integrated PES  
Our results, together with the previous discussion, indicate that existing 
governmental PES as well as their integration into environmental policies re-
quire better targeting. As to that, the ES concept is closely linked to rules for 
identification of certain ecosystem structures and processes as policy goals. I 
assume that quantification in biophysical units, such as liters of purified water 
or tons of carbon sequestered, can capture and even visualize the services 
provided by nature as well as its values to humans (cf. Matzdorf et al., 2014). 
Explicitly captured services could be used to require effective tying of pay-
ments to the delivery of the units, making them conditional. Thereby, the use 
of ES quantification may enhance governmental PES independently from a 
change to output-based PES. The visualization of the delivery of certain units 
can also be monitored in input-based payments schemes or used for spatial 
targeting of payments. Furthermore, through quantification, specific aims, 
value dimensions, and possible trade-offs could be explicitly expressed (Jax et 
al., 2013). The quantification can help to broaden the societal legitimation of 
payments by showing farmers’ contributions to the production of public 
goods, preventing hidden subsidies and promoting trust in political processes 
(Matzdorf et al., 2014).  
Potter and Wolf (2014) critically reveal that the main focus of EU and US 
agri-environmental policies still does not involve scientifically sound output 
quantifications or output-based payments. Even if certain attempts have been 
conducted, they emphasize continuing debates over funding levels rather than 
on targeting, as well as problems with knowledge gaps and methodological 
challenges encountered in linking payments to outcomes. However, due to the 
great overall emphasis of science, policy makers, and higher-level administra-
tion on ES research and usage, I argue that the ES concept’s application may 
provide an opportunity to shake the historical relations and commitments 
within the existing policy community, which shaped the evolution of adminis-
trative routines described by Potter and Wolf (2014).  
Assessing ES is a highly complex task and may involve uncertainties in the 
levels and stability of ES provision as well as in complex feedback (Engel and 
Schaefer, 2013). In our results, this complexity has been considered problem-
atic because such assessments are difficult to mainstream and convey (Paper 
3). Yet, Matzdorf et al. (2014) argue that nature’s complexity is currently not 
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comprehensible by any approach and probably never will be, and everyone 
who is governing resources must address it (cf. Salzmann, 200524). As to that, 
I argue that, despite the disadvantages and pitfalls of the ES concept, the po-
litical and scientific popularity as well as the increasingly specific research and 
vibrant discussion of various aspects, enable extensive inter- and transdisci-
plinary attention to these complex problems. Accordingly, the integration of 
the ES concept requires much effort, especially clear rules for quantification 
and new paths for targeting of governmental payments as well as the verifica-
tion of ES delivery and goal achievements. With respect to that, Reed et al. 
(2014) note that exact ES monitoring is expensive, which is why they suggest 
new combinations of methods, such as pressure-response functions, outcomes 
from process-based biophysical models, and qualitative and quantitative ex-
pert-based assessment. For enhanced modeling, the integration of existing 
data across all relevant governmental entities as well as the development of 
new approaches is required (as discussed in Paper 3). Paper 5 shows that in-
tegration of modeling may be problematic in terms of land user trust and 
indicates strong reservations toward science. Thus, participatory modeling 
(Cabrera et al. 2008) or mediated modeling (van den Belt, 2004) seem par-
ticularly promising and should be taken into account. Furthermore, research 
and policy makers should look at new approaches to civil society participation 
in monitoring, as in the integration of ES quantification or monitoring and the 
innovative approach of citizen science (cf. Theobald et al.; 2015; Couvet and 
Prevot; 2014). 
ES valuation for remuneration and PES integration 
Finally, I will address the question of whether rules for ES valuation and 
monetization improve existing governmental PES. Generally, the determina-
tion of what characterizes an ES and what is quantified implies implicit 
judgment of what is valued (Schröter et al., 2014). Valuation has been under-
stood as an important part of the ES concept and its implementation (Paper 3), 
but it is also involved in many other decisions concerning the management of 
scarce resources. There are different concepts of valuation: not only econom-
  
24 “Indeed, as any environmental policy course makes clear in the first class, these are the same 
challenges facing any policy instrument, fiscal or regulatory, designed to conserve natural re-
sources. In other words, regardless of the policy instrument employed—whether prescription, 
penalty, persuasion, property, or payment—one must determine: (1) what services need to be de-
livered, (2) how they are to be provided, (3) who the providers and beneficiaries are to be, and (4) 
how much service provision is necessary”  (Salzmann, 2005: p. 899). 
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ic and monetary but also non-monetary, such as socio-cultural valuation and 
deliberative decision making (cf. Schröter et al., 2014). Correspondingly, En-
gel and Schaefer (2013) suggest distinguishing between the ES concept and 
economic valuation, as non-monetary assessments and alternative decision 
support methods motivate policy makers as well. There is an ongoing, very 
critical discussion of whether and how ES should be valued (cf. Schröter et al., 
2014; Gómez-Baggethun and Ruiz-Pérez, 2011). In terms of existing govern-
mental PES, so far, concrete valuing of single ES has nearly no impact on 
payments. Most payments are detached from the ES value and paid as com-
pensation for additional costs and lost income due to induced changes in land 
use practices (Plieninger et al., 2012). These amounts are paid on an average 
and are not calculated individually. For example, in the case of the EU agri-
environmental payments, a calculation on the basis of provided ES is problem-
atic because payments exceeding opportunity costs are prohibited. Potter and 
Wolf (2014) describe these as examples of second-best political compromises 
to address different policy problems, which can, in part, be supported by our 
results (Paper 2). 
I argue that despite all criticism, valuation approaches have the potential to 
improve existing governmental PES and their integration into environmental 
policy. Thereby, an integrative perspective of valuation (Jax et al., 2013) 
should be always kept in mind, complementing economic valuation with other 
decision criteria and approaches (Engel and Schaefer, 2013). In particular, I 
understand that non-economic valuation could be useful for involving differ-
ent stakeholder perceptions of ES in collaborative decision making (cf. Hauck 
et al., 2013). Further, I see that individual ES valuation, either monetary or 
otherwise, can help to increase the awareness of all stakeholders on the im-
portance of the service to society and may support new land user self-
concepts as ES providers (cf. above). A monetized value can help to raise 
awareness about the relative importance of ES compared to man-made ser-
vices, highlight the undervaluation of positive externalities, and enable trade-
off comparisons (Schröter et al., 2014). In this context, I agree with Matzdorf 
et al. (2014) that the general criticism of PES’ economic valuation of ES, which 
has been characterized in developing country cases, cannot be adopted on a 
one-to-one basis for developed country situations with long-standing gov-
ernmental PES. The latter PES use a much less questioned opportunity cost 
approach (cf. Engel and Schaefer, 2013) that links ES provision to the prices of 
products of alternative resource use and makes them dependent on market 
developments (Matzdorf et al., 2014). ES valuation may have the potential to 
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disentangle PES from markets and income support (cf. Paper 2) and to initiate 
justification for land user profits besides opportunity costs, especially in 
terms of positive external effects (Matzdorf et al., 2014). Nevertheless, I 
agree with Potter and Wolf (2014) that it is not likely to happen in the near 
future, as a powerful coalition continues to resist the idea, that environmental 
payments should be decoupled from farming. 
Finally, I argue that my results (Paper 3) supported by findings from litera-
ture (Corbera, 2015; Gomez-Baggetun et al., 2010) show that a focus on 
economic valuation has the potential to narrow the perception of nature in 
terms of commodities. Thus, the limits of monetary valuation should always to 
be taken into account (cf. Potschin and Haines-Young, 2011). Against this 
backdrop and Noorgard’s (2010) general criticism that the enthusiasm for ES 
is blinding us to more substantial institutional changes to significantly reduce 
human pressure on ecosystems, exactly when we make use of economic valua-
tion and monetarization and for what purposes must be carefully considered.  
6 Conclusions 
Two central objectives were formulated to guide the research conducted in 
this dissertation thesis. First, I aimed to understand how existing governmen-
tal payments, defined as PES, are institutionally designed and how they 
perform. Second, I analyzed the relevance of the ES concept for public envi-
ronmental policy, especially for PES. I refined the general research objectives 
into specific questions framed in terms of institutional design, performance 
and interplay. Regarding existing governmental PES, I analyzed the relevant 
institutional design principles to reach environmental goals and PES interac-
tions with existing institutional arrangements. Regarding the ES concept, I 
questioned the design principles of an ES-based policy, the concept’s influ-
ence on actors’ preferences and values, and the concept’s interactions with 
existing environmental policies, especially in terms of PES. Addressing the 
first research objective, to understand the institutional design and perfor-
mance of existing governmental PES, I presented institutional design rules for 
environmental effective governmental PES. Combinations of targeting, appli-
cation feasibility for land users, and information and advice are especially 
relevant. Furthermore, I showed that multi-target approaches may be benefi-
cial, and a mix of different governmental PES can be promising. Governmental 
PES interact with the existing institutional arrangements, such as environ-
mental laws. Correspondingly, I demonstrated possible effects of interplay, 
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for example, crowding-in and crowding-out, cross-sectoral cooperation, and 
new formal and informal institutions. Aiming at objective two, to understand 
the relevance of the ES concept for public environmental policy, especially 
PES, I presented institutional design principles for an ES-driven policy and 
showed that, so far, they are not completely included in environmental poli-
cies, yet integration is proceeding. I revealed that the ES concept was 
awarded a large influence on actors’ perceptions, preferences, and values, 
leading to consideration of different ES, win–wins, and trade-offs. Policy inte-
gration of the concept requires broad horizontal and vertical interplay as well 
as broad cooperation. The greatest future interaction is predicted for climate 
and agricultural policies, especially with existing governmental payment 
schemes, to explain and legitimize agricultural financial support. The overall 
contribution of my thesis is the particular analysis of developed countries’ 
governmental PES against the backdrop of the influence of the academic ES 
concept. Important individual contributions are the analysis of the interplay of 
existing governmental payments schemes with other policies and regulations, 
the development of design rule sets for successful PES, and the detailed de-
piction of the ES concept’s influence on existing agri-environmental and 
environmental policies. All in all, I understand that governmental PES are an 
essential component of contemporary developed countries’ environmental 
policy mix. Targeting and integrating different types of PES well is important 
for effective environmental governance. Furthermore, to create a sound mix 
with command-and-control approaches and social support policies, the prop-
erty rights situation, the reference point for the application of the ‘provider 
gets’ and ‘beneficiary pays’ principle, and any deviations should be made 
transparent. Different actors must collaborate based on a common denomina-
tor for the most effective PES implementation. The ES concept can generally 
help to enhance communication and provide new impulses for cross-sectoral 
cooperation. Despite being a very complex task, ES quantification offers the 
opportunity to enhance targeting of governmental payments. Economic valua-
tion and monetarization is not necessary but should not be completely 
neglected. An application must always be carefully considered and a narrowed 
perception of nature must be avoided. 
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Meyer, C., Reutter, M., Matzdorf, B., Sattler, C., Schomers, S. (2015). 
Design rules for successful governmental payments for ecosystem services: 
Taking agri-environmental measures in Germany as an example. 





In recent years, increasing attention has been paid to financial environmental 
policy instruments that have played important roles in solving agri-
environmental problems throughout the world, particularly in the European 
Union and the United States. The ample and increasing literature on Payments 
for Ecosystem Services (PES) and agri-environmental measures (AEMs), gen-
erally understood as governmental PES, shows that certain single design rules 
may have an impact on the success of a particular measure. Based on this re-
search, we focused on the interplay of several design rules and conducted a 
comparative analysis of AEMs' institutional arrangements by examining 49 
German cases. We analyzed the effects of the design rules and certain rule 
combinations on the success of AEMs. Compliance and noncompliance with 
the hypothesized design rules and the success of the AEMs were surveyed by 
questioning the responsible agricultural administration and the AEMs' mid-
term evaluators. The different rules were evaluated in regard to their necessi-
ty and sufficiency for success using Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). 
Our results show that combinations of certain design rules such as environ-
mental goal targeting and area targeting conditioned the success of the AEMs. 
Hence, we generalize design principles for AEMs and discuss implications for 
the general advancement of ecosystem services and the PES approach in agri-
environmental policies. Moreover, we highlight the relevance of the results 
for governmental PES program research and design worldwide. 
Keywords: Common agricultural policy; Environmental policy design; Com-
parative institutional analysis; Qualitative comparative analysis; Management 
agreements  




Meyer, C., Matzdorf, B., Müller, K. & Schleyer, C. (2014). 
Cross Compliance as payment for public goods? Understanding EU and US 
agricultural policies. 





Cross Compliance (CC) is a mechanism for encouraging farmers to fulfill cer-
tain environmental conditions in return for governmental support payments. 
Introduced to United States (US) and European Union (EU) agricultural policy 
from the 80s onwards, upcoming new US (Farm Bill 2012) and EU (Common 
Agricultural Policy after 2013) policies will include CC. Cross Compliance is 
seen (i) as a policy for enforcing environmental objectives or (ii) as a way to 
organize and reward agricultural public good production. In recent years, the 
instrument's effectiveness and efficiency have been criticized. To validate the 
deviating understandings, we drew back on an economic institutionalist per-
spective. We found that regarding EU CC as payment for public goods does 
not generally align with the existing German property rights distribution. In 
both the EU and US, CC standards above those contained regulatory law have 
characteristics of a payment for public goods but create severe problems. We 
conclude that CC, even if useful for triggering and broadening environmental 
protection efforts, may cause several long-term problems. Therefore, the 
rights structure should be clearly communicated, law enforcement function 
should be temporary, the instrument should be included in an overall concept, 
and payments should be better linked to the environmental output. 
Keywords: Environmental policy; Ecosystem services; Direct payments; Pay-
ments for ecosystem services; CAP; Conservation compliance  




Matzdorf, B., Meyer, C., equal contribution (2014). 
The relevance of the ecosystem services framework for developed countries' 
environmental policies: A comparative case study of the US and EU. 





The ecosystem services (ES) framework reveals ecosystems’ benefits to socie-
ty and presents a fundamental natural resource management approach. In the 
last several decades, it has gained increasing attention from the research 
community, and it recently reached the political agenda. However, does the 
concept have the capacity to cause institutional change in environmental poli-
cy? To answer this question, we developed certain criteria for an “ideal” ES-
driven policy. Based on these criteria, we analyzed the main water and biodi-
versity acts, current policy developments, and future trends within the US and 
the EU. Our analysis shows that most acts cannot be explicitly characterized 
as ES-driven policies, but parts of the concept are already included. The ES 
framework, increasingly a driver in several policy fields, can be assumed to be 
a major future influence for shaping existing environmental policies in the 
coming decades. We discussed the results based on its strengths for existing 
environmental policy conceptually, e.g., cross-sector cooperation and ES win-
win and trade-off considerations, and its weaknesses operationally, such as 
measurability and governance changes. 
Keywords: Environmental law; Institutional change; Ecosystem capacity; Fi-
nancial incentive instruments; Trade-offs; Cross-sector cooperation 
  




Sattler, C., Trampnau, S., Schomers, S., Meyer, C., Matzdorf, B. (2013). 
Multi-classification of payments for ecosystem services: How do classification 
characteristics relate to overall PES success? 





Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) are defined in different ways and a 
variety of approaches is currently summarized under the PES label. This paper 
introduces a system for the multi-classification of PES schemes. The classifi-
cation is based on different PES characteristics and their specifications. 
Analyzed characteristics include, amongst others: PES type, ecosystem ser-
vice paid for (e.g. types of services, if the PES tries to improve the quality of 
the service vs. the quantity); payments specifics (e.g. funding sources, input- 
vs. output-based payments, etc.); involved actors (e.g. actors from the market, 
government or civil society sector); duration (short or long-term), and spatial 
scale (local to global). The classification system is then applied to 22 PES cas-
es from Germany and the United States (US) that were assessed as successful 
by expert judgment. A comparative analysis (CA) is used to investigate how 
certain PES characteristics relate to PES success. Results of the CA indicate 
that characteristics such as intermediary involvement, involvement of gov-
ernmental actors, contract length, co-benefits, voluntariness in entering the 
PES agreement, and design of PES as output-based schemes are of particular 
importance for the success of PES schemes. 
Keywords: PES classification; PES characteristics; PES success; Comparative 
analysis; Germany; USA 
  




Meyer, C., Thiel, A. (2012). 
Institutional change in water management collaboration: implementing the 
European Water Framework Directive in the German Odra river basin. 





The Water Framework Directive (WFD) is in the process of restructuring the 
European water policy towards river basin management (RBM). The transpo-
sition of the WFD requires institutional change in order to comply with its 
substantive and procedural requirements. This paper investigates changes in 
water management collaboration in a federally organised Member State with 
regard to the configuration of involved actors and the spatial scale at which 
issues are considered. Based on qualitative methods, the paper presents a 
case study of the German Odra river basin and the governance of nutrient 
pollution whose origins are located all along the river and which specifically 
impacts coastal zones. We looked at actors most relevant to this management 
problem, that is, public administrations operating within different administra-
tive boundaries, the agricultural sector and environmental non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs). In order to capture institutional change, a conceptual 
framework was constructed to evaluate changes in collaboration on three in-
terrelated levels: formal institutional change, informal institutional change 
and changes in actors’ mental models. We explain complex institutional 
change as a product of multiple dynamics, which includes the content of 
shared mental models and a benefit–cost calculation that takes transaction 
costs into consideration. 
 
Keywords: Agricultural nutrient pollution; Coordination; Integrated water 
resource management; Mental models; Participation; River basin manage-
ment; Transaction costs; Water administration; Water governance 
 
